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Abstract
My dissertation chapters study the eects networks play in an auction setting. My rst
chapter explores how subcontracting creates aliation between rm's costs in an auction
setting. It rst oers a theoretical framework associating subcontractor networks in pro-
curement auctions to aliated costs of potential bidders. Based on the methodology by Li
and Zhang (2010), I construct a model that allows for cost aliation depending on rm-
pair observables. The extension is used to test for entry aliation caused by overlapping
subcontractor networks in a sample of Oklahoma Bridge building contracts from 2004 to
2011. The empirical analysis nds a statistically signicant presence of aliation, driven by
subcontracting networks, aecting rms' decision to buy for project plans.
Chapter 2 is joint work with my adviser Dr. Georgia Kosmopoulou, Dr. Dakshina
DeSilva, and Dr. Rachel Pownall. It aims to identify factors contributing to price uctuations
in artworks after an artist's death. With access to information on seller characteristics from
a historical dataset of all art auctions that took place in London between 1741 and 1913,
we investigate how trading patterns and network eects aect art sales prices at auctions.
Following an artist's death, we capture dynamic eects in sales patterns and nd that prices
decline by 7%. We attribute this decline on the conuence of non-strategic and strategic
eects, rstly on a frequent lack of access to professional consultation and secondly on
changes in trading patterns of art dealers posthumously. Our results highlight the long term
inuence of those factors on high valued art.
xi
The nal chapter is again joint work this time, with my adviser Dr. Georgia Kos-
mopoulou, Dr. Richard Sicotte, and Dr. Hojin Jung. In public procurement, most contracts
are renegotiated ex post and involve subcontractors. We examine whether there is a causal
link between subcontractor use and the incidence of change orders to amend the original
scope of a project. Since subcontracting is likely related to unobserved project complex-
ity, we use a novel IV, the predicted level of subcontracting from a method modeled after
Christakis et al. (2010), to estimate the likelihood of renegotiation. The results establish
that subcontractors are associated with an increased likelihood of change orders as well as a
higher dollar amount renegotiated.
xii
Chapter 1
Subcontractor Networks and Aliated
Private Values: Evidence from
Oklahoma Bridge Contracts
1.1 Introduction
Networks between economic agents have powerful eects on markets. They provide avenues
for information to ow (Montogomery 1991, Trusov et al. 2009), trust to form (Karlan
et al. 2009), and provide insurance in the absence of formalized institutions (Townsend 1994,
Fafchamps and Lund 2003). However, at the same time networks raise concerns about
assumptions econometricians make when formulating their models. One such concern and
the focus of this paper, is potential interdependence of error terms between connected agents.
Consider a class of students who will study for and then take a test. These students can
either study alone or in pairs. A researcher might hypothesize that studying with others has
a positive eect on average test grades, but that is not the only eect. Students who study
together learn the material through the same process and thus answer questions in a similar
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manner. So, if one student scores high (low) then we would expect their partner to score
high (low) as well. Essentially the errors between the pair are related. If this relationship is
not considered, then an econometrician will misestimate the average eect of studying with
another student.
We study this relationship in the context of highway procurement auctions. Like the
above example, bidders in highway procurement auctions share relationships with one an-
other, primarily through mutual subcontracting. In a sample of Oklahoma bridge auctions
from 2004 to 2011, the average pair of bidders shared 4.3 subcontractors in the previous
year. This paper seeks to answer several questions about how the existence of mutual sub-
contractors aect bidders' costs in highway procurement auctions both theoretically and
empirically. These questions are of interest not just to econometricians, but also policy mak-
ers as relationships between bidder's cost change bidding behavior as well, making bidders
less aggressive and leading to higher procurement costs for the state.
Researchers in the auction literature are keenly aware of the possibility of interrelated
costs or values which they refer to as aliation, as they are interested in bidders underlying
values of items for bid and not just the bids they place strategically. First described in
Milgrom and Weber (1982) (hereafter MW), the concept of aliation is a generalization of
the relationships between bidder's values, allowing bids to be positively related throughout
the full distribution of values. The introduction of aliation, as described by MW, changes
bidder strategies and makes them bid less aggressively as compared to those with indepen-
dent private values (IPV).1 Their theoretical work shows that when aliation is present,
increasing the information access in an auction leads to higher expected revenues. Kagel
et al. (1987) and Goeree and Oerman (2002) tested MW's work to show that the theo-
retical predictions on revenue generation hold in an experimental setting. Pinkse and Tan
1This accrues because if a bidder wins an auction it means they probabilistic misjudged the value of the
item up for auction. This behavior is similar to the winner's curse seen in common value auctions, but to a
lesser extent because values are not perfectly related.
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(2005) shows theoretically how aliation in rst price auction, can lead to violation of the
monotonic properties of the bidding function with respect to the number of bidders, as is
the case with IPV, indicating that it may be in the best interest of the seller to limit the
number of bidders in order to raise prices.
Relationships between bidders, including subcontracting relationships, have been pointed
to as potential causes of aliation that cannot be controlled for using only auction char-
acteristics. Haile (2001) and Li and Zhang (2010) (hereafter LZ) found that selling timber
rights to subcontractors after an auction created aliation.2 In a follow up paper, Li and
Zhang (2015) studies how this aliation aects rm mergers using a structural model. The
existence of common subcontractors and suppliers in the market motivated the inclusion of
aliation in Nakabayashi (2013) in studying small business set asides, and Rosa (2019) in
studying bid preference programs. On the other hand, Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011)
dismiss the inclusion of aliation in their work on bid preferring, citing the relativity small
value that common subcontractors contribute to projects in their sample. While all six pa-
pers are concerned about aliation remaining between bidders in an auction, each treats
it as a general phenomenon which aects all rms equally. We allow the eect of mutual
subcontractors to vary between bidders by incorporating network information about which
subcontractors have work with a bidder in the past.
Aliation is not the only eect subcontracting has on bidder's costs. Marion (2009)
shows that government requirements for the inclusion of minority owned subcontractors
increased procurement prices, using California Proposition 209 as an exogenous treatment
for a dierence-in-dierence framework. Using a sample of road construction rms in Texas,
De Silva et al. (2017) nds that subcontracting helped rms stay in the market longer,
especially newly established rms and those without outside options, potential improving
2The way aliation in Haile (2001) eects expected price is dierent than in MW as aliation through
the possibility of future subcontracting raises, not lowers expected sale price.
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long-term competition. Marion (2015) looks at how horizontal subcontracting, whereby a
rm is both a bidder in an auction as well as a subcontractor for another bidder, aects
behavior in California highway auctions. He nds empirically that the practice has a small
negative eect on procurement prices. In his setting there are two competing forces at play:
cost reduction and increasing opportunity costs.
The literature on the impact of networks in an auction environment is scarce. De Silva
et al. (2020a) demonstrates that the network of art dealer in London from 1750-1914 passed
information along. Those dealers with advantageous location in the network paid lower
prices, earned higher prots, and stayed in the market longer. De Silva et al. (2020b) shows
dealer's purchase networks of artists helps explain the divergence of art pricing following the
artist's death. Jung et al. (2020) uses subcontractor networks to causally identify the eect of
subcontracting on highway procurement renegotiation in Vermont. Lastly, the most closely
related paper to my work is He et al. (2020) which evaluates how network opportunities of
small and Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBE) are aected by opportunities in the
subcontracting market, and the resulting impact on bidding outcomes and rms' longevity
in the industry. This paper does not explore the role of aliation in bidding behavior.
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we layout a simple theoretical
framework, by which overlapping subcontractor networks lead to aliated private values as
well as what measures best capture the aliation. Second, we provide a model by which the
theory can be tested expanding the work of LZ. And nally, we use that model to empirically
test the theoretical prediction on data from bridge construction projects procured by the
Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT), which show there is strong evidence
associating subcontracting and aliation among rms' decision to become planholders and
in rm's bid values. This sample includes information about subcontractors used by winning
bidders which is used to construct network measures for use in analysis. The most important
of which is the measures of subcontractor overlap between pairs of potential bidders.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides a theoretical framework
for how overlapping networks subcontracting would lead to APV, and which measures are
most closely related to aliation. In Section 1.3, an extension of the model of LZ to test
for APV, through subcontracting overlap is proposed. Section 1.4 describes the sample of
bridge and approach auctions in Oklahoma from 2004 to 2011. In Section 1.5, the results
from the smooth simulated maximum likelihood estimation are reported. Section 1.6 oers
a number of robustness checks for the results. Finally, Section 1.7 oers discussion of the
results and concludes.
1.2 Theory
Two models by which the submission of bids will be aliated, are proposed in LZ. The rst
model has potential bidders uncovering their cost prior to the decision to submit their bids.
If rms have aliated costs, their bidding behavior will be aliated. This is the most likely
way to create aliation between bidder in a procurement auction as potential bidders must
buy detailed engineering plans from the state prior to letting. Even before buying plans,
ODOT provides details on projects, such as their location, time to competition, and which
material and jobs will be need on a project. Thus, rms should have a sense of their private
costs for a project, even before buying plans. The second has rms deciding to enter an
auction, which comes at some xed cost, before learning their independent value. Thus, any
rm deciding to place a bid, must have expected prots of bidding greater than the xed
entry cost. If the entry costs are aliated, as might well be expected if a non-trivial part
of the bidding process is standardized by the seller, then bidding behavior will be aliated.
This model of aliation is less likely to exist in the data from ODOT as some rms place
bids on projects that have little prospect of winning. About 1% of bids are in excess of 150%
of the engineer's estimate.
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A subcontracting network would most likely aect bidder behavior through the rst
model. Using two assumptions and Theorem 3 of MW, we can show that overlapping sub-
contractor networks create aliation between bidder's private values. The rst assumption
made is that the total cost of one contractor hiring a subcontractor to complete a job is
aliated with the total cost of a dierent contractor hiring the same subcontractor. This
assumption seems reasonable and not very strong as it does not require the cost to be the
same for both contractors. Marion (2015) makes a similar assumption in his model of hor-
izontal subcontracting, where there are two parts of working with a subcontractor, a direct
cost which is the same for all and a coordination cost which diers across contractors.3 The
second assumption made is that all contractors minimize their costs on a project, which is a
common assumption in the auction literature (Marion 2009; Miller 2014; Rosa 2019). This
assumption is important as minimization is a nondecreasing function in all its arguments.
The nal piece is Theorem 3 of MW which states that aliated imputes fed through a non-
decreasing or nonincreasing function will lead to an aliated output.4 If both assumptions
are valid, Theorem 3 of MW holds and thus overlapping subcontractor networks lead to
aliation in bidders' private costs. Furthermore Proposition 1 of LZ,5 also holds and any
discrete-choice decisions by potential bidders will as be aliated.
Because private values are aliated through mutual subcontractors, aliation will not be
equal across all pairs of bidders. Bidder pairs sharing more subcontractors will have higher
levels of aliation. Additionally, bidders with more outside options should see lower levels of
3The assumption in Marion (2015) is as follows: [The subcontractor's cost] is comprised of two com-
ponents, the direct cost of rm j completing the task cBj , and an IID contractor subcontractor specic




j + ξij .
4The full text of Theorem 3 of MW is as follows:If Z1, . . . , Zk are aliated and g1, . . . , gk are all non-
decreasing functions, then g1(Z1), . . . , gk(Zk) are aliated. The Zis can be thought of as a vector of input
cost for all the items a project requires which are available to bidder i. These input costs can be a rm's
cost to provide an item in house, or the cost of hiring various subcontractors to do the same. While gi(·) is
the rule bidder i uses to pick among the set.
5Proposition 1 of Li and Zhang (2010): Let D = (D1, . . . , DN ) ∈ {0, 1}N denote bidder 1, ... , bidder
N's entry decision. If V1, . . . VN are aliated, then D1, . . . , DN are also aliated.
6
aliation as the shared subcontractors are less likely to be used. Finally, aliation will not
be transitive. If Contractor A shares subcontractor X with Contractor B, then their private
values will be aliated. Similarly, if Contractor B shares subcontractor Y with Contractor
C their values will also be aliated. However, Contractors A and C's private values will not
be aliated as they do not share a subcontractor.
After establishing the theoretical existence of aliation, the next step is to propose a
measure that best captures the aliation between two contractors because of overlapping
subcontractors. The rst possible measure is the count of overlapping subcontractors, but it
fails to consider outside subcontracting options. Two other potential measures, from network
theory, are good candidates, as they oer a normalization of the number of subcontractors
shared between two contractors, by the level of outside options the pair has. They are jaccard








where Ni is the neighbors, in this case the subcontractors, of contractor i. A priori neither
measure should be preferred to the other, as both provide a normalization of overlap between
two contractors.6 However, intuitively both oer benets over the count of overlapping
subcontractors, the numerator of both, since the eect of one overlapping subcontractor
should not be the same if rms have a dierent number of private subcontractors.
Here simulation is useful as calculating the exact distribution of the minimum for any dis-
tribution, besides uniform, is dicult. First, we begin by randomly assigning 2 contractors,
A and B, a number of subcontractors in their network between 1 and 20 inclusive. Then we
randomly assign the number of shared subcontractors by both between 0 and the minimum
of A and B's subcontractor counts. Finally for each subcontractor 10,000 private values are
6please see chapter 2 of Fouss et al. (2016) for more details on jaccard and cosine similarity as well as
other similarity measures.
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drawn, and each contractor's value is taken as the minimum of its subcontractor values, and
a correlation coecient is calculated. then the process is repeated 10,000 times for several
distribution (uniform, normal, etc.).
The results of the Monte Carlo simulations can be seen in Figure 1.1. As seen by the
R2 values, both similarity measures do very well in explaining the change in correlation
using only a quadratic projection, though the jaccard similarity slightly outperforms the
cosine similarity in 4 out of the 5 cases. However, it can be seen quite clearly the count of
overlapping subcontractors is a poorer predictor than either normalized method.
The private costs in Figure 1.1 reect the costs of a single task. When a project includes
multiple tasks, the relationship becomes more complicated but both jaccard and cosine
similarity performs well. Additionally, the results in Figure 1.1 are that of subcontractor
values that are exactly the same for both contractors. If instead the costs a subcontractor
oers are more weakly related the relationship will maintain the same functional form but
will be compressed along the y-axis so that at similarity (either jaccard or cosine) of 1, the
correlation will be less than 1, and the variance will be higher.
1.3 Model
Our test is based on a modication of the method of LZ. They use a smooth simulated
maximum likelihood estimation (SSMLE) method to look at aliated entry behavior in the
Oregon timber market. In their model aliation is constant across all rms in an auction
but our modication allows for variation between rm pairs based on a rm-pair observable.
SSMLE is a common method of estimating models with correlated error terms, rst developed
by Geweke (1991); Börsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993); Keane (1994). It shares many
of the same properties of maximum likelihood estimation, the most important of which is
that as the number of simulations and observations approaches innity the results will be
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consistent. The decision to participate in an auction is a discrete choice, and LZ uses a
probit specication. The functional form used in LZ serves as the basis for this paper as well
is:
Dait = I(xat · β + zait · γ + εait > 0) (1.2)
Where Dait is rm i's decision to compete in auction a at time t, I(·) is an indicator function,
taking a value of 1 when the rm decides to compete and 0 otherwise, xat is a vector of
auction-level observables, zait is a vector of rm-level observables, and εait is rm level error.
The error is assumed independent of xat and zait, but allowed to be aliated with the other
error values in the same auction, εai′ , where εai′ 6= εai.7
Without using subcontractor network information, general aliation can be tested ex-
actly as in LZ. In their specication the variance-covariance matrix for potential bidder in





where all o diagonal elements are the same constant, ρ, which is between -1 and 1, as it is
a correlation coecient. Firms submitting bids will have aliated values only if ρ ≥ 0.
We go a step beyond and allow ρ to vary for dierent potential bidder pairs, with respect
to a measure of subcontractor overlap between potential bidder pairs, which as shown in the
previous section cause rms' private costs to be aliated. This will allow for the possibility
7LZ also include an auction random eect ηat, in their model as well, which is excluded as regressions
with a random eect found its size to be small (less than 10−6) and were interfering in calculating standard
errors, as it made the Hessian information matrix near singular.
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Where ρijt = ρjit and −1 ≤ ρijt ≤ 1. For ρijt, we propose the following functional form:
ρijt = ρ0 + ρ1 · Pijt (1.3)
Where Pijt is a pair-wise measure of the overlap in the subcontractor networks of poten-
tial bidders i and j at time t. A linear specication of the aliation is chosen because it is
more readily interpretable, signicance can be shown using standard errors, and it is straight
forward to ensure the correlation parameter does not exceed its natural limits.8 The speci-
cation divides aliation into two parts, the general component, ρ0, and a network overlap
component, ρ1. Three measure of network overlap are presented in this paper, the jaccard
similarity, cosine similarity, and the count of overlapping subcontractors. While all three
measures are expected to capture some amount of the aliation, the count of overlapping
subcontractors is expected to be the weakest, due to the measure not being normalized as
discussed in Section 1.2.
To conduct SSMLE, rst the auction and potential bidder observables are used to predict
the rst rm's entry decision. Then, the predicted entry probability is compared to the
actual entry. Next a simulated error term for the rst rm is drawn from a truncated
8A previous version of this paper used a functional form of ρijt = 2/(1 + exp(ρ̃0 + ρ̃1 · Pijt)) − 1 which
also ensured the aliation was between -1 and 1, and had the added benet of having a slight decreasing
returns to scale of the overlap measure. However, to determine signicance required using the log likelihood
ratio test and interpreting the marginal eects was dicult so was replaced. Ultimately because all overlap
measure used in this paper skewed toward 0 the change in specication does not change the model goodness
of t.
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normal distribution.9 This simulated value is then used as an additional control variable
with is coecient determined by the error variance-covariance matrix. This continues until
reaching the last potential bidder in an auction, which will use all errors up to that point
to predict its entry decision. The process is repeated in each auction many times to get an
unbiased estimate of the errors. Repeating for each auction and taking the natural logarithm
of the probabilities, allows for a straightforward method to minimize the error term as in
standard maximum likelihood estimation.10
We choose a probit specication over a logit specication because we are interested in
the correlation between observations. A logit model cannot readily incorporate correlation
into the error term as the conditional logistic distribution is not a logistic distribution. On
the other hand, a probit model, with normally distributed errors, can incorporate correlation
with nonzero o-diagonal elements of the error variance-covariance matrix.
Using the method outlined above, it is possible to establish if contractors have aliated
private costs, with only a rm's binary decision, and not their bid value. This property is
valuable as determining private costs through bid values requires assumptions about how
bidders markup their bids from their private costs, and thus is more susceptible to misspeci-
cation.11 However, not using bid values is throwing out information and can be problematic
if bidding decisions are not closely tied to costs as might be the case if the marginal cost to
preparing a bid is low.12
While the method we propose does have the potential to assign aliation to the intersec-
9The distribution is truncated because the error term cannot be known exactly, only that if it is above
−xat · β − zait · γ
hait,ait
, when the rm bids or less than
−xat · β − zait · γ
hait,ait
when the rm does not.
10Please see Li and Zhang (2010) for a complete understanding of the methods.
11Misspecication concerns often arise from assumptions about the rms attitudes towards risk (i.e. are
rms risk neutral or risk averse, if they are risk averse what functional form will the risk aversion take, and
are they all equally risk averse).
12As a robustness check we test for aliation between bid values in Subsection 1.6.1. These results
also point towards aliation created by subcontracting overlap but requires additional assumptions on bid
discounting.
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tion of subcontracting networks, one must be cautious declaring the observed relationship
causal. There are other ways that bids could be aliated, such as overlapping suppli-
ers, which might be expected to be related to overlapping subcontractors, as suggested by
Nakabayashi (2013). Supplier overlap would create aliation in a similar way to overlapping
subcontractors. Unfortunately, the data is not available to us to explore this hypothesis.
Another potential way for bidders to have aliated values is through joint ventures between
bidders. Firms which participate in joint ventures may learn about the methods of the other
by working together, which could lead to aliation in the future if they compete against one
another, while also sharing subcontractors, because of the relationship. While we do know
which rms have worked together as joint ventures incorporating an additional pairwise vari-
able greatly increases the diculty of ensuring ρijt does not exceed its bounds. Even with
these shortcomings, this paper still contributes to the literature, as no work has been done
on factors which empirically predict aliation.
1.4 Data
The data for this paper consists of all projects the ODOT auctioned o between 2004 and
2011. While the dataset includes all auctions, only bridge and approach contracts, which
are contracts to build new bridges, are focues on for analysis because they oer a more
homogeneous set. This decision is in line with previous research in the auction literature.
Ji and Li (2008) used only auctions involving bridge repair in their study of secret reserve
pricing, and LZ considered only auctions of a single species of timber. In addition, bridge
and approach projects rely heavily on subcontracting, making them ideal for testing the
importance of subcontracting on aliation. Of the 516 contracts in the sample, 474, or
92% of winning rms used at least 1 subcontractor, and on average used 4.9 subcontractors.
Subcontracting also contributes signicantly in terms of dollars spent. The average rm
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awarded a contract during the period paid subcontractors $358,088, or an average of 24% of
the winning bid.
Next, it is important to know which rms are potential bidders. LZ assume rms are
potential bidder, based on the rms that bid on project in a similar time frame. We use two
dierent denitions in this paper. The rst is the set of rms which become planholders for
a project. ODOT requires all bidder to buy the project's plans before bidding. Becoming a
planholder is nearly costless with the average cost of plans being 0.0024% of the estimated
value of the associated project. While low plan costs should not discourage rms with positive
expected prots for a project from participating, they will prevent extremely disadvantaged
rms from competing. For example, rms which already have large commitments on other
projects or rms located far from the project sight may be discouraged from buying plans.
As such, a second broader denition of potential bidder is also used, which we call a potential
planholder. A potential planholder is dened as any rm which was a planholder for any
bridge and approach auction in the month of observation. Using potential planholders also
allows for running regressions on a second discrete choice rms make, the decision to become
planholders.13
In the ODOT dataset there are 128 unique planholders for bridge and approach contracts,
89 of which went on to bid at least once, and 50 of whom went on to win at least one project.
The dataset includes 516 auctions with 3,061 planholders, and 9,524 potential planholders.14
About 60% of planholder end up submitting bids in any individual auction. A much smaller
number of potential planholder participate, with only 30% becoming planholders and 18%
becoming bidders.
The subcontractors in the sample are even more diverse than the planholders, and in-
volved 268 unique rms, which completed 2,513 dierent jobs over the course of the sample
13In Appendix A1.1, we repeat all analysis on potential planholder's decision to bid.
14One outlier auction is dropped, because the engineer's estimate is 6 times that of the next largest project.
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period. The mean amount a subcontractor is hired for was $73,700, though the median
was only $15,750. The itemized lists of the jobs completed by subcontractors suggests that
they mainly perform peripheral jobs, which lines up with previous research (Miller 2014).
Of the 8,057 items that could be linked to subcontractors, the most common type of items
fullled by subcontractors where signage (699), guardrails (585), asphalt and surfacing (416),
mulching (390), painting (325), and excavation (292).15
The auction variables available include the number of planholders in the auction,16 the
engineer's estimated value of the contract,17 the number of contract days, the number of items
in a contract, the percentage of contract that is supposed to be set aside for disadvantaged
business enterprises (DBE), and the unemployment rate in Oklahoma18. Most variable are
standard to include in the procurement literature models, except the DBE goal and the
unemployment rate. Prior work oers conicting eects of DBE goals, with Marion (2009)
nding that they lead to an increasing procurement costs while De Silva et al. (2017) nds no
such eect. Finally, the unemployment rate is included as a proxy for the eect of the Great
Recession on the demand for new construction in the private sector, which may aect rm's
outside options. Summary statistics for auction variable can be seen in Table 1.1. Several
of the variables have a signicant right-skew as indicated by their means being greater than
their medians. This is a common occurrence in highway procurement auctions as there are
a small number of projects that are signicantly larger than majority. To counteract the
skew, the natural logarithm of the following variables is taken: engineer's estimate, contract
days, and project items.
The potential bidder specic variables include the distance from the job site,19 and the
15It is not until the 13th most common task that a non-periphery job appears, drilling shafts (151).
16For any models involving potential planholders, total potential planholders are used instead.
17For any models involving potential planholders, plan cost is used instead as rms would not have detailed
information about the project until reviving plans. Plan costs closely relate to engineer's cost as the price
of plans is a function of how many printed pages the plans take up.
18Gathered from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
19Distance from the job site is calculated by taking the distance in miles from a planholder's mail address,
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backlog of the rm.20 Both variables have been shown to be important in assessing an
individual rm's private values in prior works: distance from the job sight in LZ, and backlog
in Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2000).
Lastly, there is the contractor's network of subcontractors. Ideally, to construct each
rm's subcontracting network all subcontractors a potential bidder considered using for a
project should be included. Obviously, that is impossible to measure, so past subcontrac-
tor use is constructed as a proxy. Previous research shows repeated relationships between
rms are a mechanism by which to lower transaction costs and manage risk in the face of
incomplete information (Kvaløy and Olsen 2009). To construct the subcontractor network,
all subcontractors a potential bidder used in Oklahoma in the prior 12 months are linked
to the rm.21 The 12-month window is chosen as that is the 75th percentile length between
repeated subcontractor uses by a contractor in the sample. 54% of links are repeated in this
time frame. Framed another way, if all subcontractors active in the market have the poten-
tial to be chosen to work with the winning bidder, previously unconnected subcontractors
are hired 1% of the time, while connected subcontractors are hired 16.6% of the time. To
initialize the network all observations from 2004 are dropped from analysis. The auctions
from 2004 also help to set up the rm backlog.
The network formed by subcontracting is a directed one, because subcontracting is not
a reciprocated action. This can be seen in Figure 1.2 where the potential planholders (the
red nodes) are connected to the subcontractors (the blue nodes) by arrows. Figure 1.2 looks
at four slices of the network, in January 2005, April 2007, September 2009, and December
2011. Over time the network becomes denser with more potential bidders and subcontractors
gathered from ODOT's preapproved contractor list, and the center of the county that a project is located
in.
20Backlog is calculated as the value of all current contracts a rm is currently working on with ODOT,
whether as a contractor or a subcontractor, divided equally for the length of the contract in months, beginning
with the month following the award date.
21This includes subcontractors used on projects outside of the bridge and approach contracts focused on
in the estimation stage.
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entering the market. While most of the links are between the potential bidders and sub-
contractors, there are also links between potential bidders. Thus, horizontal subcontracting
exists in the sample which should be accounted for. Those rms which are horizontal sub-
contractors may be less likely to bid as their opportunity costs of winning a contract are
higher (Marion, 2015). Lastly on the periphery of the network can be seen a number of
potential bidders who did not use any subcontractors in the sample.22 These rms create a
problem for properly analyzing aliation generated by overlapping subcontractor networks
since these rms likely have relationships with subcontractors, which are unobserved. This
will lead to a downward bias in any network variables. This is particularly concerning re-
garding the similarity measures which will be used to predict aliation. Thus, all rms with
no observed subcontracting relationships are dropped from analysis.23
The contractor-subcontractor network can create several useful measures that can be
used as explanatory variables to capture a potential bidder's place in the network. The
measures used in the paper are seen on the bottom of Table 1.2 and are referred to as
centrality measures. The simplest of these is outdegree centrality, which measure how many
subcontractors a potential bidder is linked to. Next, potential bidder's hub centrality is
calculated, which measures a rm's relative importance in the network by looking at the
subcontractors it is connected to.24 Potential bidders with high hub centralities work with
subcontractors involved with many others in the network. Finally, network information is
also used to determine whether rms are horizontal subcontractors to other contractors in
the network which about half of potential bidder are.
The nal variables of importance are the potential bidder pair data, which are theoret-
ically predicted to cause aliation. Descriptive statistics of these variables can be seen in
22Though dicult to see because of the many overlapping lines in the center, there are also several other
potential bidders who have no observed subcontractors, but who are connected as horizontal subcontractors.
23We incorporate the rms with no network in Subsection 1.6.3 by including additional pairwise variables.
24In mathematical terms, hub centrality is the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue ofA×AT ,
where A is the Adjacency matrix of the network incorporating all link information about the network.
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Table 1.3 and histograms of the distribution can be seen in Figure 1.3.25 Overlap is calcu-
lated as the count of subcontractors shared between potential bidders. For planholders, the
average pair shares 4.6 subcontractors though the distribution is right skewed since 7.5% of
pairs have no overlapping subcontractors. For potential planholders the average pair shares
fewer overlapping neighbors at 3.3 subcontractors and 12% of pairs have no overlapping
networks.
To create the jaccard similarity, the number of overlapping subcontractors is divided by
the total number of subcontractors used by the pair. For cosine similarity, the number of
overlapping subcontractors is divided by the square root of the product of the two rms'
total subcontractors used. Both similarity measures are laid out in Equation 1.1. Because of
the presence of horizontal subcontracting, rms are linked to themselves so that they appear
in their set of subcontractors. For the average planholder pair the jaccard similarity is 0.13
while for potential planholders it is only 0.10. Again, these number are skewed because there
are many rms which share no subcontractors. The average and standard deviation of the
cosine similarity is larger as the denominator is smaller. For planholders the average is 0.25
while for potential planholders it is 0.20. The distribution of both similarities can be seen in
Figure 1.3. Most of the data has low levels of overlap, but the long right tail indicates that
some rm pairs have high levels of overlap.
1.5 Results
With the ODOT data detailed in Section 1.4 and the discrete-choice method outlined in
Section 1.3, it is possible to test for the existence of aliation brought about by overlapping
subcontracting, which is theoretically predicted in Section 1.2. General aliation is also
checked for as well, with the method outlined in LZ. We also explore the role of subcontracting
25Again, we take every subcontractor used in the prior 12 months by a potential bidder as in a bidder's
network.
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relationships on potential bidder's costs using the network centrality measure controls. When
using SSMLE, the number of simulations done is a tradeo between computational eciency
and statistical eciency. LZ ran 100 simulations, but the nature of the method requires an
increased number of simulations as the number of observations increase. For regressions on
planholders, 400 simulations are used, and those on potential planholders, 700, to counteract
the increased number of observations in the ODOT data, compared with Oregon timber
data.26
The results for planholder's decision to bid, can be seen in Table 1.4. Column 1 is a
standard probit model to compare the other models with. Column 2 contains a regression
with only a general aliation parameter. There is no evidence of aliation between plan-
holders decision to bid, and in fact the point estimate for ρ0 is less than 0, but insignicant.
Moving to the models with variable aliation in Columns 3, 4, and 5, there is no indication
of subcontractor created aliation from the jaccard similarity, cosine similarity, or count
overlap. The results do not show evidence of the theory, but there are concerns with the
model. First, it does not have a great deal of explanatory power with a Pseudo R2 of 0.044 in
all ve specications. Second, the average probability of entry is 60%. Taken together these
two facts mean the predicted errors feature little variation to nd an eect, as conditional
errors do not feature much variation.
As for the other coecients, most traditional independent variables have the expected
sign, or are insignicant. Turning to the network parameters, only the hub centrality has
a signicant eect on bidding behavior. Firms with higher hub centrality are shown to be
more likely to bid. The high value for hub centrality suggests that it is not the number of
subcontractors which aects a rm's cost on a project, but a rm's connections to highly
used, and therefore experienced subcontractors.
26LZ dataset contains 282 timber auctions with 2,055 potential bidders. For a better understanding of the
asymptotic properties of simulation-based methods, see Train (2009).
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Turning to potential planholders' decision to become actual planholders, in Table 1.5
Column 2, there is evidence for generally aliated costs. The point estimate for ρ0 is
0.031, and is statistically signicant. Bringing in variable aliation leads to a substantial
improvement in the model and ρ1 being positive and signicant at the 1% level in all three
cases but is strongest with the cosine similarity. Once variable aliation is allowed ρ0 is no
longer positive and signicant. In fact, in the case of cosine similarity, ρ0 is negative and
signicant. This result may be a product of plan buying being a sequential process, where a
rm deciding to buy plans later can observe the rms which have already bought plans and
avoid projects with high levels of competition and thus lower expected prots. Overall the
potential bidder's plan buying decision is better predicted then the bidding decision with a
Pseudo R2 of 0.130 in the general aliation case. This means the simulated errors contain
more information about that can be used to forecast the other rms' decisions.
A few of the signicance levels changed between Tables 1.4 and 1.5 particularly among the
auction variables. Log working days and rm, went from being insignicant in planholder's
bid decision to signicant. This is again likely a product of rms choosing to avoid becoming
planholders on less protable projects.
The network variables continue to show similar eects as in Table 1.4, but the outdegree
centrality and horizontal subcontractor dummy both become negative and signicant. The
horizontal subcontractor nding supports the theory of Marion (2015), that horizontal sub-
contractors face higher opportunity costs in bidding decisions. The nding about outdegree
centrality combined with the continued positive sign on hub centrality reinforces the hypoth-
esis that connections to subcontractors on the periphery of the network are less important
compared to those in the center.
Throughout both decisions, cosine similarity served as the best predictor of aliation
between pair of potential bidders, while overlap served as the worst predictor. While the
later results are not surprising since based on the theoretical discussion from Section 1.2, the
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former is. In the simulation results jaccard similarity and cosine similarity were about equal,
but the empirical results show a clear preference for cosine similarity. We speculate that the
increased variation within the cosine similarity distribution, due to the smaller denominator,
is the reason for the improvement.
1.6 Robustness Checks
In this section several robustness checks are provided to show the results are not brought
about by the assumptions made in the model. First in Subsection 1.6.1, we show that bid
values are also aliated with one another. Next in Subsection 1.6.2, we change the window
size for the network from 12 months, up to 18 months and down to 6 months. Subsection
1.6.3 works to included potential bidders without networks into the model, with the inclusion
of more potential bidder pair measures. Lastly in Subsection 1.6.4, we change the network so
that subcontractor links are weighted by the dollar value of service instead of just a dummy
for previous work.27
1.6.1 Aliation in Bid Values
In Section 1.5, aliation is found only between potential planholder and is strongest in the
decision to buy plans. Potentially, aliation could only be applicable to the early phases of
the bidding process, after which aliation no longer exists when rms submit their bids, due
to information gained throughout the process. Alternatively, the inability to nd aliation
between planholders could be due to the low level of predictive power of the model. To
dierentiate between the two possibilities, we test for aliation between rms bid values.
However, unlike the discrete decisions previously examined, aliation between bid values is
not proof of aliated private costs, as rms may strategically change their bids to maximize
27While we present the robustness checks one at a time in the paper, there is nothing to prevent multiple
from being tested at the same time. Any additional checks are available upon request.
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prots. If rms are assumed to markup their bids linearly, as is done by others such as Kagel
et al. (1987), then aliation between bids is evidence that subcontracting causes aliation
in private costs. This assumption is stronger than those made above, and is unlikely to hold
in practice, but the results still shed light on aliation of bidder's costs.
The method used to test for aliation between bid values is Bayesian, and is modeled as
follows:
log(bidait) = xat · β + zait · γ + εait (1.4)
just as in the discrete choice models xat is a vector of project characteristics, zait is a vector
of bidder characteristics and εait is a normal distributed error term which is potential related
across bidders in the same auction. The switch from a maximum likelihood framework in
Section 1.5 to a Bayesian one is because the model now includes a contentious value errors,
which can be found through analytically techniques instead of simulation. Still, the model
has complex derivatives, but these can be sidestepped with the Bayesian model.
For the model's prior distributions, we assume an uninformed prior, with the aliation
parameters this is a uniform distribution between -1 and 1, while for the rest it is a normal
distribution with mean of 0 and standard deviation of 10 times the variable standard devia-
tion. The model uses a Gibb's sampler to sample from the posterior distribution. A sample
from the posterior distribution is found using 4 chains of 10,000 samples thinned by 20 steps.
Again, general aliation as well as aliation cause by subcontractor overlap are tested.
When looking to bidding behavior the sample size is greatly reduced with 1,921 bidders,
3,530 pairs, across 514 auctions. However, more information about the errors is revealed
through the estimation process so correlation is easier to detect if present. Table 1.6 shows the
results of the Bayesian regressions. Column 1 show a regression without aliation. Due to
the strong relationship between the engineer's estimate and bid costs the predictive power of
the model is much stronger than the previous regressions. Column 2 shows a regression with
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only constant correlation parameter between bidders in an auction. The results indicate that
there is a general correlation between bids which is signicant at 1%. While this may indicate
a general level of aliation, it could also indicate there is an unobserved project characteristic
which are causing bids to be correlated as well. Columns 3, 4, and 5 allow for aliation
related to jaccard similarity, cosine similarity and number of overlapping subcontractors just
as above. In all 3 cases ρ1 is positive and signicant at the 1% level. The point estimates
for all 3 are comparable to those found in Table 1.5. Finding variable aliation among bid
values supports the hypothesis that aliation is present throughout the bidding process but
is dicult to nd between bid decisions since information on the error is scarce.
As for the other parameters all except the bidder's backlog have the expected sign or are
insignicant. This may be due to backlog being correlated with a rm's size, which may
indicate that there are returns to scale in the marketplace. Of the three network variables
only the hub centrality has a signicant eect, with rms with more extensive networks
placing lower bids.
The results of Table 1.6 also highlight the importance of including pairwise aliation
to avoid bias in a model. Several control variables saw their point estimates shift due to
the inclusion of aliation. The most dramatic shift is seen for hub centrality, which fell
by 21% from Column 1 to Column 4. If aliation is not included the direct benets of
subcontracting are overestimated.
1.6.2 Changing Network Window
As mentioned in Section 1.4, a 12-month window for the network was chosen because in lined
up with the 75th percentile of time between links that where repeated. But it is possible the
window is too long or too short. As such in this section, the same regressions from Section
1.5 are presented with a 6-month and an 18-month network window. Both come to the same
conclusions as the main results, though the 6-month window's nding are weaker.
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Due to the requirement of setting up the network and dropping and rms without net-
works, the sample sizes change due to the changing network window. The models with only a
6-month window have more auctions, but fewer potential bidders and fewer pairs, giving less
power to nd aliation, while models with an 18-month window have less auctions, about
the same number of potential bidders, and more pairs, giving more power to nd aliation.
For the sake of brevity only the estimates for ρ0 and ρ1 are presented in Tables 1.7 and 1.8.
Both show the same eects or are insignicant, for jaccard and cosine similarity, though
there are dierences with regressions using the number of overlapping subcontractors with
a 6-month window in the bid decisions. There potential bidders with higher overlaps see
negatively aliated values. This may occur because given the short window subcontractors
who have worked on multiple projects may be near capacity and unable to perform work for
either rm, forcing them to seek dierent rms to work with instead.
1.6.3 Incorporating Potential Bidders without Networks
In the main results, due to constraints viewing the past network all rms which had no
observed subcontracting links in the previous 12 months were dropped. Without further
additional variables, their inclusion would lead to a misestimation of the results since these
rms would likely use some subcontractors from the available pool, and lead to potential
aliation. To include these previously dropped observations, three additional pairwise vari-
ables are added to equation (3). Thus, the aliation between 2 potential bidders' errors is
now:
ρijt = ρ0 + ρ1 · Pijt + ρ2 ·mijt + ρ3 ·mijt · cijt + ρ4 ·mmijt (1.5)
The new pairwise variables are mijt which measures if one, but not both potential bidders
have no observed network in the past 12 months, cijt which measures the number of subcon-
tractors the other rm has used in the previous 12 months, and nally mmijt which measures
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if both rms have no observed network in the past 12 months. In eect these cover the 3
possible cases the network coverage between 2 bidders. If both have an observed network
only the Pijt will be nonzero, if one has a network then mijt and cijt will be nonzero, and
if both have no network then only mmijt will be nonzero. As such this specication does
not make it more dicult to ensure the model is not violate the bounds of ρijt, despite the
increase in parameters.
Under the hypothesis of subcontractor network driven aliation both, there should be
variations in aliation between these 3 cases. When only one rm has a network, theory
suggests that aliation rises as the rm with an observed network has more links, since
there are more chances the subcontractors the rm without a network connects to one of the
rms the other used. Similarly, if both rms have no observed network, they should be more
closely related than 2 unlinked rms with networks, since they have a higher likelihood of
subcontracting out to similar rms.
The results of incorporating the rms with missing networks are presented in Tables
1.9 and 1.10. For the sake of brevity only the pairwise variable results are presented. An
additional dummy variable indicating if a rm has no observed network is also included
when running the regression. Lastly, an increased number of simulations are run due to the
increased sample size of including more rms. For Table 1.9, 450 simulation are used, while
Table 1.10 uses 800.
The eect of network overlap, ρ1, remains similar in all cases, to the main results where
the unlinked rms were dropped. In further support of the theory the interaction between 1
rm having a missing network and the others count of subcontractors, ρ3, is positive in all
specications though not always statistically signicant. Similarly, pairs where both rms
have no network, ρ4, is also positive and statistically signicant in all specications.
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1.6.4 Incorporating Dollar Weighted Networks
So far, we have assumed that all links between subcontractors are the same, both for the
centrality measures and for the level of overlap for aliation. However, subcontractors are
used at dierent intensities so a weighted measure may be more appropriate. As such in this
subsection, a weight is given to links based on the dollar value of projects subcontracted out
in the previous 12 months.












where linkait is the dollar weighted link between contractor a and subcontractor i at time t.
The set of subcontractors also includes the set of prime contractors, which leads the values of
weighted jaccard and cosine similarity to be much smaller than that the unweighted versions
because rms fulll about 80% of a contract's costs themselves. Changing the network to
a weighted network also changes the values of outdegree and hub centrality for the rms as
well.
The results for this robustness check are shown in Tables 1.11 and 1.12. For brevity only
the aliation parameters and network parameters are included in the tables. The results
for the jaccard and cosine similarities continue to be consistent with earlier results, though
the overlap amount is insignicant. However, the centrality measures are less signicant
predictors as compared to the unweighted network. These contribute to a lower Pseudo R2
values for all three decision. While initially surprising, the result may be due to another
eect such as subcontractor backlogs, leading to the unintuitive result. It could be useful in
future research to include both weighted and unweighted network measures simultaneously
to separate the eects.
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1.7 Conclusion
On the theoretical side, we nd that the presence of overlapping subcontractor networks
creates aliation among the private values of rms. This theoretical prediction is then
tested and found in the decisions of potential planholders, but not planholders on a sample
of bridge auctions from Oklahoma. The dierence in results is likely caused by several
factors. First, statistical power is greatly increased when the denition of potential bidder is
expanded to include 9,524 observations instead of 3,093.28 Second the independent variables
available at our disposal are better able to predict the potential planholder outcomes than the
planholders based on the pseudo R2, which reduces the overall noise in the model. Though
the aliation is found only using the broader denition of potential bidders, the nding
is robust to changing the assumptions made in the paper about the network. Lastly, bid
values are also aliated in the sample because of subcontractor overlap, which under more
restrictive assumptions also implies that private values are aliated.
The results shown in this paper are likely of interest to both policy makers and econome-
tricians. For the policy maker, the ndings raise questions about how subcontracting aects
government procurement costs. Previous work, including Milgrom and Weber (1982) suggest
that the presence of aliation will lead to decreased bidder aggressiveness and thus lead to
higher cost for the state. However, our work also shows that subcontracting networks have a
direct negative eect on costs. This leaves the overall eect of subcontracting on government
costs ambiguous. Further work on the topic will still need to be done to determine which
eect dominates. It is also possible that subcontractor related aliation does not aect costs
exactly as the standard models suggests. Aliation has been shown to aect competition
in dierent ways in dierent settings (see Haile 2001). Still, we recommend caution when
evaluating policies that encourage intensive use of a narrow set of subcontractors, such as
28the increase in pairwise observations increases even more from 9,471 to 91,497 due to their being N ·
(N − 1)/2 pairs per auction.
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DBE goals.
For the econometrician looking into rm behavior in auctions, the results reveal a new
feature which must be considered. If overlapping subcontracting exists and she assumes
an IPV framework in her model, results will be biased and inconsistent. This eect will
likely be most severe when looking at variables related to subcontracting, as seen in Table
1.6. The methodology laid in this paper, also has potential applications beyond auctions to
any setting where economic agents are making decisions and a network is likely to lead to
correlated behaviors, such as students test taking in the example from the Introduction.
More work is still needed in this area beyond what has been done here. While work in
this paper demonstrates that subcontracting overlap leads to aliation, there are questions
about how aliation changes bidder aggressiveness as well. There are also other relationships
such as common suppliers or joint ventures which could create aliation in a manner like
that of common subcontractors that exists in the market and are worth exploring in the
future. Finally, work to incorporate variable aliation into a structural model is another
avenue for future research.
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Chapter 2
Posthumous Trading Patterns aecting
Artwork Prices
2.1 Introduction
Prior to their deaths, two 19th century British landscape artists, J. M. W. Turner and
Horatio McCulloch, experienced similar patterns of success selling paintings at auctions.
Both were quite popular in terms of the breadth and depth of trading connections their art
had established through the years. After their deaths, their popularity diverged. Turner
became the eminent landscape painter of this era, with art dealers purchasing a larger share
of his paintings. Dealers bought 77% of Turner's paintings compared to 42% of McCulloch's
work. The most prominent art dealer of this period, Agnew, bought 28% of all Turner's
paintings sold after his death. Changes in popularity were further mirrored in art prices.
Turner's paintings appreciated by 122%, while McCulloch's sales prices fell by 32%. This
divergence in prices can be seen up to the present day. The last 24 Turner paintings that
went up for sale at Christie's and Sotheby's had an average hammer price of $926,000, while
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McCulloch's last 16 paintings sold for only $25,800 on average.1 Why did their popularity
diverge so drastically? The prices at which their artwork sold following their deaths seem
to have been inuenced by the network of dealers and auction houses connected to them at
the time of death.
Posthumous eects on art prices have been observed in the literature before, but previous
work about its size and attribution have largely been inconclusive. Does the art market value
the fact that an artist is alive, and can potentially produce more work? Or being alive is
an impediment to posthumous market success once the artist has reached his or her peak?
These questions remain unanswered. It is perhaps rather elusive to try and nd a one-size
ts all answer to the question of why it occurs and how it manifests itself. Nevertheless, we
have now an opportunity to use comprehensive records from more than 37,000 transactions
sold in London auction houses over a period of a century and a half containing information
on artists who lived and died in that period. We combine these records with a set of tools to
distill the eect of trading networks and provide a more in-depth analysis of the competitive
landscape in this market around the time of an artist's death and beyond, tracing subsequent
posthumous pricing patterns.
The inuence an artist's death has on the price of their art depends on factors that
aect demand and supply. Since art serves as an investment tool, the change in the pricing
of artworks triggered by an artist's death has drawn attention from scholars in economics
and nance. Agnello and Pierce (1996) were rst to estimate an increase in prices after an
artist's passing using regression analysis. Posthumous eects were documented anecdotally,
however, well before Agnello and Pierce with comments by art dealers and even a play on the
subject written by Mark Twain titled Is He Dead.2 Two plausible explanations have been
oered for this trend. First, a temporary demand spike after death could be caused by an
1https://www.christies.com/ and https://www.sothebys.com/en/ Accessed January 4, 2020
2The play is about a famous French painter Jean-Francois Millet. An American artist helps Millet fake
his death with the idea that the price of his paintings will skyrocket, and they will escape poverty.
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increase in media attention (Ekelund, Ressler, and Watson 2000 and Matheson and Baade
2004). Alternatively, elimination of supply uncertainty could lead to a permanent increase
in prices. Maddison and Jul Pedersen (2008) use data on Danish artists, and Danish life
expectancy, and their ndings suggest that conditional life expectancy of the artist at the
time of sale (which is a proxy for anticipated supply conditions) has a statistically signicant
negative eect on art prices. Once conditional life expectancy is included, the posthumous
eects are no longer statistically signicant. Ursprung and Wiermann (2011), show that
the death eect is negative for young artists, becomes positive with age and eventually
disappears.
The demand for artworks depends crucially on an artist's reputation. Reputation eects
are hard to measure and have largely been absent from the literature. Reputation is managed
in the primary market for art by gallerists and art dealers. Schrager (2013) notes that the
industry has developed an intricate signalling process where a handful of galleries, collectors
and museums, determines what is good and valuable. Grant (2010) points out that the
factors determining whether prices will go up or down are much the same when an artist is
dead or alive. These factors include the degree to which the market of an artist's work is
controlled, changes in critical and popular appreciation, the manner in which dealers heirs
or estate executors handle work in their possession and how collectors behave. The dealer's
ability to strategically drive demand through developing an artist's reputation depends on
a dealer's network and the strategic planning of sales following an artist's death. Greater
access to art professionals prior to an artist's death is likely to aect the trajectory of prices
of his work providing vital information in addressing this puzzle.
In this paper, we construct measures of network access and use a quantile regression tech-
nique with selection, developed by Arellano, Blundell, and Bonhomme (2017), to evaluate
the drivers of art prices, with focus on the `'death eect and posthumous trading patterns
extending to 20 years after an artist's death. Even though there is a vast literature on
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networks in economics and broadly the social sciences3, there is very little empirical work
examining the eect of trading networks on prices. Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan
(2012) nd that co-purchase networks have an eect on the demand for books sold on Ama-
zon. Aral and Walker (2012, 2014) nd that inuential users of Facebook cluster together
and have dierential eects on other users based on observable characteristics, such as age
and sex. In the art world, Mitali and Ingram (2018) nd that artists with many personal
connections but who are not clustered together are more successful in raising their artistic
prole. De Silva et al. (2020a) nd that networks between art dealers and sellers create in-
formational advantages that are reected in benecial trade conditions. Our results indicate
that the strategic planning of sales following an artist's death can have a signicant impact
on art prices in the short and long run.4 Access to art professionals prior to an artist's death
signicantly aects the trajectory of prices for the most highly priced works of art.
In a similar approach to Etro and Stepanova (2015), we use an historical set of data which
uniquely allows us to look at all art auctions that took place in London from 1741 to 1913 to
study the death eect. We nd, contrary to most of the literature, a decline in unconditional
prices by 7% on average in the 20 years following the death of an artist. At that time, the
art seller is much more likely to be listed as a member of the artist's family (0.7% of art
was sold before death under an artist's last name versus 13% that was sold after death).
These works are sold for much less than other artworks by the same artist bringing forth
considerations of poor quality and strategic planning. Artists themselves may strategically
withhold some artwork from the market, while families acting without consultation with
professionals may engage in nonstrategic liquidation of assets. While these considerations
3Examples include friendship formation in Christakis et al. (2010), job searching in Granovetter (1977),
and micronance adoption in Banerjee et al. (2013), and Schilling and Phelps (2007) and Gaonkar and Mele
(2018) dealing with interrm patent collaboration, among many others.
4The impact of various strategic and non-strategic eects on price trends in sequential sales has been
studied among others by Black and De Meza (1992), Ginsburgh (1998), Deltas and Kosmopoulou (2004)
and Ginsburgh and Van Ours (2007). Deltas and Kosmopoulou also provide an overview of conditions under
which various price patterns can arise in equilibrium.
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might hold in a short period after the death of an artist, the negative eect in the long term is
mostly predicted by changes in the composition of the pool of buyers. Artists who see a rise
in price posthumous are bought more often by emerging art dealers. Since only a few artists
experience an increase in dealer interest, most artists' works see a decline in price after the
artist's death. The lack of a signicant trading network developed through auctions prior
to death diminishes the chances of an artist's work gaining popularity postmortem. These
changes in the buyer pool is likely not the direct cause of the price change, rather underlying
evolution of collector's taste is at play. However, without a good measure for taste we argue
eigenvector centrality is a useful proxy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the data and how we
construct the trading network measures for the artists and sellers; Section 2.3 describes the
model and the results. Finally, Section 2.4 oers concluding remarks.
2.2 Data
The source of our unique historical data set is the auction transactions recorded by (Graves,
1918). In three volumes, Graves documents art auctions that took place in London-based
auction houses from 1741 to 1913, including the name of the auction house. We retrieved
these three volumes from the Victoria and Albert Museum Library in London. Graves
recorded the name of the artist and his/her living status, the name of the artwork and
year of origin, and the medium (painting, gurine, etc.). Using the name of the artist, the
painting, the title of the painting, and the year of origin, we can categorize each artifact into
a school, movement or a period. The unique feature of the data is the availability of the
original sellers' and buyers' identities in the transactions. However, besides the rst and last
names of the buyers, the original data does not provide any other biographical information.
Therefore, we used museum archives to identify art dealers among our buyers. With this
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search, we were able to classify 138 distinct buyers as dealers who, in total, account for 43%
of all transactions.
Note that all lots were sold using an English auction format and only the nal hammer
price is recorded. The size of the dataset, and the length of the time period that it covers,
provide a unique opportunity to trace price uctuations and trading network connections
throughout an artist's lifetime and beyond his death.
The data allows for the construction of two time-evolving networks used to capture
market inuence. The rst is a bipartite network that links buyers and artists through
auction trades.5 The second is a directed network that links buyers and sellers.6 Both
networks are updated monthly and use a 10-year moving window to capture the relevance
of recent information and limitations in institutional memory for dealerships.
Based on the artist-buyer network, we calculate the artist's eigenvector centrality, weighted
by the number of artworks sold. This measure captures the relative importance of individ-
uals in the trading network by considering their full set of trading links across the market
that occurred before the transaction. It is a proxy of the inuence that an artist's buyers
have in the market and reects the conuence of reputation and popularity of the artist.7
Reputation is keenly important in the art world but is often dicult to measure. Ursprung
and Zigova (2020) use the length of an artist's obituary as a indicator of reputation. Sim-
ilarly, in another eort to isolate general reputational eects, Campos and Barbosa (2009)
nd that paintings exhibited prominently or listed in a catalogue raisonné, a compendium
of an artist's work, sell for a premium.
Eigenvector centrality is a measure attempting to nd the most important nodes (indi-
5A bipartite network is one in which there are two distinct types of nodes that always connect to a node
of a dierent type. The network is considered bipartite because the set of buyers and artists do not overlap.
6A directed network is an appropriate framework to represent links between buyers and sellers, since they
have distinct roles with potential overlap. The same individual could be a buyer in one occasion and a seller
in another, which occurs for about 10% of the buyers and sellers.
7Even though the reputation of an artist's work is often dicult to assess, Fraiberger et al. (2018) use
eigenvector centrality to assess museum and gallery prestige.
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viduals) in a trading network by incorporating information about the buyers who purchase
the work of an artist.8 An additional link to any buyer will increase an artist's eigenvector
centrality, but the size of the increase will vary based on the number of connections the
buyer has. A buyer with no other purchases will cause only a minimal increase, while a
purchase by Agnew, the biggest art dealer, will increase it much more. Thus, artists with
many connections to important buyers will have high eigenvector centrality.9 In our sample,
those important buyers tend to be art dealers, who buy about 50% of art. The eigenvector
centrality is weighted according to the number of art pieces sold, to assign weight and impor-
tance to artists who are repeatedly bought at auction by the same buyer. The buyer-seller
network allows us to capture which sellers have been present in the auction market before,
and how often they sell. Because of the heavily right-skewed nature of the network variables,
we include them in their logarithmic form in all regressions.10
Reputational eects of other parties involved in the auction might also aect the prices
at which artworks are sold. Sellers with frequent dealings in the market may see their lots
sell for more as the risk of forgery is lower. Similarly, works with anonymous sellers may
suer a penalty for not revealing their identities. Lastly, the reputation of the auction house
must also be considered. During the time frame, Christie's was the preeminent auction house
responsible for 95% of all auction sales.
We restrict the sample to include only those artworks sold within 20 years of an artist's
death and only artists whose paintings were sold before and after their death. In Table 2.1,
8The eigenvector centrality of all the nodes in a network is the principal eigenvector of the adjacency
matrix, which is an N×N matrix containing all the information about links between nodes. Bloch, Jack-
son, and Tebaldi (2019) includes a full explanation of eigenvector centrality and as well as other centrality
measures.
9Calling the importance of each node in the network as its centrality score, in measuring eigenvector
centrality we want the centrality score to be proportional to the sum of scores of all nodes which are
connected to it. This way if a node is connected to another important node, it will also be important and
vice versa. A more detailed denition of eigenvector centrality and the other variable included in the paper
are included in Appendix Table A2.1.1
10Many networks, including our networks, follow a power-law distribution characterized by a long right
tail.
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we provide summary statistics broken down by sales before and after death. We observe
3,127 artworks sold before death and 4,633 sold after death by 160 dierent artists. This is
a substantial increase in sample size relative to most of previous research. Ekelund, Ressler,
and Watson (2000) included only 21 artists in their sample, Matheson and Baade (2004)
had 13 baseball players, and Maddison and Jul Pedersen (2008) included 93 artists. An
exception is in the work of Ursprung and Wiermann (2011) who, despite their considerable
sample size, focused on the most prolic artist who sold more than 250 pieces over 26 years.
Most of our observables about the artworks remain largely unchanged, with a few notable
exceptions. First, the average price falls signicantly after death from 382 to 355, while
the standard deviation rises from 508 to 566. These two changes suggest that there are
dierential eects throughout the price distribution. Second, art sold with a seller's name
that matches the artist's name increases from 0.7% before death to 13% after death.11 Since
an artist cannot sell work after death, this increase is mostly because the families of artists
were typically selling o art from their workshops by way of an estate sale. Thus, we refer to
this sales as those sold by family. Artworks sold by the family sell for much less on average
than those sold by others (184 compared to 382) and have a strong eect on price within
the rst two years of an artist's death. Panel A of Figure 2.1 shows the density in log prices,
identifying whether a seller's name matches the artist's name, in the 20 years after an artist's
death. The artworks sold by the family of the artist are sold at far lower prices compared to
the full sample and are commonly found on the left tail of the combined price distribution.
Panel B of Figure 2.1 shows the timing of pieces sold. For works not sold by family, sales are
consistent throughout the 40 year time period, but 47% of all works sold by family happen in
the year immediately following an artists death, and an additional 8% are sold the following
year.12 The lack of strategic consideration on behalf of the artists' families is a considerable
11Names were matched according to the last name and rst initial.
12The other large spike at nine years after death is from sales of a single artists work, Benjamin West.
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factor contributing to the short-term uctuations of prices posthumously. While art sold by
the family may be an important determinant of price changes after death, this observation
oers an incomplete explanation of the price trend as 79 out of the 160 artists did not have
family sell their works after death.13
Finally, there is an increase in both measures of artists' trading networks. An artist's
market inuence measured by his eigenvector centrality increases from 0.0055 to 0.0113
and the number of pieces sold increases from 30.6 to 43. This raw change misrepresents
how artists' networks are changing, as it oversamples artists with many paintings sold. By
comparing an artist's eigenvector centrality at death to later times, we avoid this problem.
Only 33.8% of artists have higher eigenvector centrality ten years after death than at the
time of death, while 37.5% did not have any artworks sold during the same period. The
decline is even more dramatic 20 years after death, with only 25.6% of artists having higher
eigenvector centrality than at death, while 45.5% of artist had no artworks sold for ten years.
Those artists with high eigenvector centralities at death continued to have higher eigen-
vector centralities after death as well. Due to the skewed nature of eigenvector centrality the
natural logarithm is taken. At 10 years out, current log eigenvector centrality and log eigen-
vector centrality at death still strongly correlated, with a correlation coecient of 0.532.14
At 20 years out, the correlation remained strong at 0.432. In a similar vein, artists with high
eigenvector centralities were more likely to continue to be sold after death. Those artists
with sales 10 years after death had an average log eigenvector centrality at death of -8.34,
signicantly higher than that of artists with no sales, at -9.58. The dierence is even more
stark at 20 years out, where those with sales had a log eigenvector centrality at death of
-7.74 compared to a log eigenvector centrality of -9.41 of those with no sales.
13This includes J. M. W. Turner and Horatio McCulloch, the two artists mentioned in the introduction.
14This is despite the fact that no artworks have been included in both groups as the window for link
formation is 10 years.
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2.3 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we model how changes in network structure can explain the downturn in
artwork prices following an artist's death in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The rst
model we estimate is a hedonic regression model of logarithmic prices with artist xed
eects, followed by a quantile regression analysis to study behavior across the distribution.
Ashenfelter and Graddy (2006) provide an excellent overview of the merits of the hedonic
pricing model relative to the repeat sales methodology for art price indices, where the price
of the ith artwork sold in time period, t, is determined by a small number of by now,
conventional hedonic characteristics, x, controlled for in the regression. We control for all
the usual characteristics that are used in these hedonic pricing models, such as artist, size,
medium, and genre. The unique contribution of this dataset is that in addition to the usual
hedonic characteristics, we have the identity of the buyers and the sellers, and can identify
their status, for example, as a dealer, collector, aristocrat, or artist.
Since all prices are determined through an auction process, selection on buyer observables
is a consideration. Dierent classes of bidders, such as art dealers, may have dierent
willingnesses to pay for attributes creating dierences in price. Because our main variable
of interest relates to who buys a work, selection bias would be problematic. Thus, we use
the two-step Heckman process (1979) to estimate the mean, and the method of Arellano,
Blundell, and Bonhomme (2017) to estimate the quantiles of the response variable. Their
method corrects for selection by adjusting the percentile level of each observation based on
the probability of selection. In practice this requires a three-step process. The rst step uses
a probit model to predict selection, which in our case is the probability that a bidder wins
the auction. The second step estimates the correlation between the probability of winning
and the price. This correlation, along with the probability of winning and the Gaussian
copula15, determine the level to which each observation's `check' function, from a standard
15The Gaussian Copula describes the joint probability distribution of correlated normal random variables
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quantile regression, needs to be rotated. To nd the correlation parameter that best ts the
data requires a grid search, testing values from the full range and selecting the one with the
best t in selected quantiles.16 The nal step then estimates all the quantiles of interest
utilizing the estimated correlation.
Since all works are sold in an English auction, the hammer price will be determined by
the second-highest bidder's willingness to pay. Thus, we allow bidders of dierent types-in
particular, art dealers-to have diering values of an artwork based on its observable charac-
teristics. As such, we interact a dealer dummy variable with all observable characteristics.
Introducing a selection model allows inclusion of additional buyer specic variables which
are determined endogenously through the auction process. Thus, our rst stage model is:
Pr[winabt|Xabt, dealerbt] = Φ(β ·Xabt + γ ·Xabt · dealerbt) (2.1)
where Xabt captures seller, artist, bidder, and artwork characteristics, and includes a variety
of controls such as dummy variables for seller's type (artist, collector, unknown, etc.), the
logarithm of the seller's volume of past sales, an artist's log eigenvector centrality and log
of the number of artworks sold. Xabt also includes the buyer's log eigenvector centrality
and log capacity, time trends, and the logarithm of the number of buyers. The estimation
incorporates a dummy variable for whether a work of art was sold at Christie's, whether
it was part of a collection, the artist's age, artistic school, artwork medium, and artwork
genre.17 Lastly we also include variable incorporating information about the rival bidder
likelihood of winning including the maximum rival log eigenvector centrality, maximum rival
capacity, and the percentage of bidders who have purchased the artists work previously. Since
a full record of all bidders of an artwork are not known, we consider all winning bidders at
and is used to connect the error of the selection stage to the pricing stage.
16We use the 0.20, 0.40, 0.60 and 0.80 quantiles just as Arellano, Blundell, and Bonhomme (2017) did.
17We could not adequately control for art size, as only a third of artworks have size measurements in the
data.
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the auction house on the day of sale as potential bidders. The bidders who won items in
an auction sale were typically present throughout the day's auction on the oor assessing
competition and planning their bids. The average auction had 112.8 pieces for sale, bought
by 41.3 buyers. Bidders had an opportunity to submit 316,512 potential bids on artworks
sold within 20 years of an artist's death, of which about one-third could have been generated
by dealers.
The results of this rst-stage regression can be seen in Table 2.2. Non-dealers are less
likely to purchase art created by artists with higher eigenvector centrality and more likely to
purchase art from artists with many artworks sold in the past or from unknown sellers. Art
dealers are more likely to purchase art by contemporary British artists. A buyer's eigenvector
centrality is of importance to only the dealers' likelihood of purchase. Interestingly, the rival
eigenvector centrality and capacity only aect a dealer's likelihood of winning but not a
non-dealer's, hinting at strategic consideration more prominent in dealer's actions.
In the second stage for the mean regression, the log price is estimated using a Heckman
two-step process:
lnpriceabt = β · phabt + δ ·Xabt + σ12 · λabt + αa + εiat (2.2)
where λabt is the inverse mills ratio of bidder b on piece i by artist a, generated from the
estimation of the probit model. The model also includes artist xed eects. Lastly, phabt is
a dummy variable identifying whether an artwork is sold after an artist's death.
Due to the price variance increasing after death, we then estimate a xed eect version
of Arellano, Blundell, and Bonhomme (2017) to assess how the death and network eects
change the distribution of prices. The same rst stage from the Heckman model is used to
nd the selection error, but the method for calculating the correlation between the rst and
second stage errors is dierent. The correlation coecient, ρ̂, is estimated through a grid
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search. Using ρ̂ from the second stage grid search and the inverse Gaussian copula the nal
stage becomes:
Qlnpriceiat(τ |phiat, Xiat, ρ̂) = βG−1(τ,p̂(z);ρ̂) · phiat + δG−1(τ,p̂(z);ρ̂) ·Xiat + αaG−1(τ,p̂(z);ρ̂) (2.3)
where G−1(τ, p̂z; ρ̂) is the inverse Gausian copula, between the rst and third stages. Due
to the nature of the model, standard errors are estimated using bootstrapping.
The results of the panel quantile regression can be found in Table 2.3. In Panel A, we
included only an artist xed eect and a dummy variable for the living status of the artist,
but no correction for sample selection. A signicant negative eect is observed in all but
the 0.10 conditional quantile. In contrast, when controls are added in Panel B, there is
no signicant posthumous eect at any quantile, suggesting the observable changes in an
artist's network and estate sale strategy can explain the large decline in prices. The same
results are shown graphically for all quantiles in Figure 2.2. While sample selection was
possible, we did not nd a statistically signicant relationship between the rst- and second-
stage errors as seen in ρ̂ being insignicantly dierent from 0 at both the mean and across
the entire distribution.18 This low correlation is most likely due to the winner being the
bidder with the highest private value for the artwork but the price being determined by the
second-highest private value. Of the controls introduced in Panel B, the sale of artwork by
family members has the most profound negative eect on prices. The eects can also be seen
graphically in Panel B of Figure 2.3. Consistently, across the distribution, we observe a steep
decline in sales prices for those families who did not use professional consultation and chose
to sell directly at auction.19 The art market, in general, seems to place a heavy premium
18Results of the regressions without sample selection are quantitatively the same and are available from
the authors upon request.
19Interestingly, the mean estimate is below all the quantile point estimates between the 10th and 90th
quantiles. This is most likely caused by a severe penalty in the quantiles below the tenth. Due to the artist
xed eects, a consistent estimate below the tenth conditional quantile is impossible.
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on reputation, with art sold at Christie's, the leading auction house, selling for a premium.
Paintings sold by anonymous sellers sell for signicantly less. The insignicant eect of the
seller's volume of transactions is most likely due to low variation of sales numbers per seller.
Networks developed through the auction trades have a benecial eect on prices. An
artist log eigenvector centrality has a strong positive inuence on prices, with the strongest
eect observed near the median of the distribution. The eect at all quantiles can be seen in
Panel A of Figure 2.3. Note that, the volume of artwork is controlled and has a negative eect
throughout the distribution.20 The buyers log eigenvector centrality has a negative eect
on prices, suggesting that those buyers with large networks are able to discover underpriced
works. The result is in line with ndings in De Silva et al. (2020a) suggesting that a network is
a source of information creating advantages that are reected in benecial trade conditions.
This eect is strongest at the upper end of the distribution. Similarly, dealers pay lower
prices when they buy, compared to non-dealers.
Prices continue to evolve overtime estimated through the use of a cubic time trend in-
cluded in all regressions.21 However this trend does not intuitively describe price changes
overtime. As such, we ran a second regression replacing the time trend with three dummy
variables identifying non-overlapping time intervals after an artist's death. The rst covers
the rst two years after death, the second from two to ten years after death and the nal
from ten to twenty years after death. Since all other coecients are nearly identical to the
rst model, only the estimates of the dummies are shown in Figure 2.4. None of those point
estimates are statistically signicant at the 5 level, though the point estimates are lowest
20Results of a robustness check replacing the artist's log eigenvector centrality with the log count of dealer
purchases is available upon request. This measure is more intuitive but lacks the ability to dierentiate
within groups. It does not capture the relative importance of a dealer in comparison to others. As such,
it suggests that dealers with a high count of previous purchases buy a lot more inexpensive art, while the
results on eigenvector centrality suggest that important dealers (in relative terms) not only buy inexpensive
artwork but highly-priced pieces as well.
21The cubic time trend was chosen as it oered exibility about the evolution of prices around an artist's
death.
41
between the 0.5 and 0.75 quantiles and in the second window.
While artists' trading connections have a signicant eect on prices, it is less clear whether
a network that has been developed around the time of death is a good indicator of prices in
the years after an artist's death. To explore this question, we focus on the log eigenvector
centrality in the 10-year window ending with the month an artist died, as a measure of the
artist's importance in the network. In particular, we estimate the following model:
lnpriceit = β · lneigenvectorit + δ ·Xit + εit (2.4)
The regression includes all the same controls introduced earlier except for the artist xed
eects and sample selection, since eigenvector centrality at death is constant per artist, and
there was no evidence of statistically signicant sample selection in the previous regressions.
We run this regression on both the mean using OLS, and on the distribution using quantile
regression, similar to the previous estimation eorts. The regression is repeated for three
time windows after death. The rst includes information for two years following death, the
second from two to ten years, and the nal from ten to twenty years.
The results for the eect of log eigenvector centrality at death on log price can be seen
in Table 2.4 and Figure 2.5. At the mean, the log eigenvector centrality is signicant only in
the rst window. The point estimate also falls as the window span increases. If we instead
consider the conditional quantiles, an interesting pattern emerges. For the 0.25 conditional
quantiles the eect of the eigenvector centrality at death is indistinguishable from zero in
all three windows. It is only at the upper tail that a signicant eect can be seen. At the
0.90 conditional quantile, the eect is highly signicant with a magnitude that diminishes
gradually after death. In fact when looking at the upper tail, the eigenvector centrality at
death is a stronger predictor of price in the ten to twenty year window, compared to the two
to ten year window. Even twenty years after death the network at death remains signicant
42
at the 1% level for high priced art. For all the other quantiles there is a steep decline in the
eect of this measure on price with distance from death.
The dataset provide us with a unique opportunity to investigate the role of the family
on the price distribution following an artist's death. In Table 2.4, we see that sellers with
the same family name as the artists sell the most expensive artworks rst, with the highest
coecient on the 90% quantile. The coecient is negative and statistically signicant,
providing empirical evidence that the artworks are sold at a discount and indicating that
families sell the most valuable paintings rst. Since we only capture a fraction of the owners of
the estate, it is likely that we underestimate the eect of family sales. It is interesting to note
that, in the time horizon between ten and twenty years after the death of an artist, the results
become positive and statistically signicant in the center of the distribution, reinforcing the
belief that nonstrategic sales dominated family actions in the period immediately after an
artist's death.
The quantile regression results in Table 2.4 for the 0.9 quantile, which represents the high
end of the price distribution, is reective of the masterpieces of the time. Our ndings suggest
that, network eects increase sales prices more at the higher end of the sales distribution and
could help bridge studies of repeat sales data to network eects in primary sales, to shed light
on price patterns for masterpieces of this era, especially the subsequent under-performance of
Masterpieces noted in the seminal works by Pesando (1993) and Mei and Moses (2002), but
notably not by Goetzmann (1993). Our ndings suggest that, any subsequent sale would
need to incorporate the price premium for network eects at the higher end of the sales
distribution aecting the performance of this art in the secondary market.
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2.4 Conclusion
The results of this study identify two factors contributing to price uctuations in artwork
after an artist's death. Nonstrategic estate sales by family members of an artist and a dealer's
buying interest both have a signicant impact on the change in art prices over time with
diering short and long term eects. Analysis of network measures allows us to capture
factors that were not accounted for in the literature before, to explore the death eect in
art prices. Once several network measures are introduced (to capture the reputation of
artists and inuence of buyers) and we consider the dynamic evolution of prices in the 19th-
and early 20th-century English art market, the negative death eect captured by a unique
identier gets to be attributed to other distinct factors.
The development of network measures also allows us to observe a mechanism by which art
prices change over time. J. M. W. Turner's paintings saw an appreciation in value after his
death because his works were overwhelmingly bought by art dealers with high connectivity
captured by their eigenvector centralities. These purchases by dealers helped elevate his
reputation and sale prices signicantly over time. Horatio McCulloch's works conversely
saw a decline in value due to his art being bought more frequently by individuals with no
professional market engagement, who were less likely to make repeat sales (see Figure 2.6).
While McCulloch did not see a decline in the number of dealers who purchased his art, the
dealers who did buy his work were less connected through trades than those who bought
from Turner, as seen by the smaller size dots representing them in the scatter plot.
While our results are able to explain away the death eect, the question still remains as
to why a negative unconditional death eect exists in the 19th- and early 20th-century art
market, while the opposite is observed in other more modern samples. We would point to the
increased sample size of our dataset, especially the number of artists. Smaller datasets tend
to focus disproportionately on artists with more prominence, creating a bias toward positive
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eects in prices. Even Ursprung and Wiermann (2011) who use a large dataset spanning 26
years, are still basing their conclusions on a sample of top achievers who have been sold at
least 250 time throughout the period. In that sense, our dataset provides the opportunity
of tracing a large number of artists for a long period of time, providing a more complete
sampling from the distribution of sales.
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Chapter 3
Subcontracting and the Incidence of
Change Orders in Procurement
Contracts
3.1 Introduction
A pervasive feature of procurement contracts is their susceptibility to ex post renegotiations.
Typically, these renegotiations are executed through change orders. Government agencies,
while recognizing their ubiquity, are keenly aware that change orders are costly. On the one
hand, there are costs associated with adapting the project due to delays, the re-scheduling of
tasks, haggling and legal expenses. Bajari et al. (2014) estimate that adaptation costs add
between 8% and 14% to the average California highway construction contract. On the other
hand, in itemized-bid contracts, rms that anticipate change orders in some items, can skew
their itemized bids strategically, thereby inating ex post project costs (Jung et al. 2019;
Miller 2014). If letting agencies are better able to forecast the incidence of change orders,
they could reduce total project costs and accordingly benet taxpayers.
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Previous studies of change orders tend to emphasize the complexity and uncertainty sur-
rounding contracting as key inuences on the likelihood of renegotiation (see Anastasopoulos
et al. 2010; Bordat et al. 2004; Hsieh et al. 2004; Iossa et al. 2007; Oudot 2006). Our focus
is on the role of subcontractor use on contract renegotiation. Like change orders, subcon-
tracting is widespread in many procurement contexts. In our dataset of Vermont highway
projects, the average project employed 5.09 subcontractors, while 90.7% of projects used at
least one subcontractor. Government interventions in highway procurement encourage the
use of subcontractors through disadvantaged business enterprise (DBE) programs. Previous
work on the eectiveness of DBE programs stops short of considering their entire impact
by analyzing only the bidding stage of the process. These studies nd mixed results rang-
ing from no increase to small and in some cases insignicant increase in procurement costs
(De Silva et al. 2012; Marion 2009). If subcontracting leads to disproportionate increases in
procurement costs at the implementation stage of the project, then the evaluation of dierent
DBE programs is incomplete.
Our dataset consists of all Vermont Agency of Transportation construction (VTrans)
contracts procured between May 2004 and December 2009. In OLS regressions using these
data, the number of subcontractors signicantly raises the number of change orders and the
dollar amount of the contract that is renegotiated. There are two possible interpretations
of this association. First, more complex projects that use more subcontractors are more
likely to require renegotiation. In this interpretation, the positive conditional correlation
is caused by an omitted variable capturing unobserved complexity. The second possibil-
ity is that the number of subcontractors on a project directly increases the probability of
renegotiation. Subcontractors might have a direct impact on the probability of renegotiation
because of poor coordination and miscommunication between subcontractors and prime con-
tractors. This possibility is substantiated in the literature (Masten et al. 1991; Miller 2014).
An additional reason that subcontracting might contribute to change orders is because of
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incentives resulting from procurement regulations. For instance, in Vermont, the Agency
of Transportation applies a ten percent premium payment to primes above subcontractors'
costs when new items are added to the contract.1 It is conceivable that this regulation could
lead prime contractors to engage in behavior that increases the likelihood of new items being
added, and then to employ subcontractors for the task in order to obtain the ten percent
prot.
To determine which interpretation is correct, we use an instrumental variable, the pre-
dicted number of subcontractors estimated from a sequential Bayesian framework modeled
based on Christakis et al. (2010) and adjusted to a dynamic setting. This IV helps us
disentangle the subcontracting activity from unobserved project complexity as a cause for
renegotiation. The model allows for interdependencies in subcontracting decisions and in-
cludes information on the experience of subcontractors and the networks developed by both
contractors and subcontractors. Our analysis includes control variables representing project
characteristics, such as the size and complexity of the project, and its geographic location,
that make the work of the state engineer who is tasked with project planning more dicult.
These increase the likelihood that the plans will need to be revised after the contract is
awarded. We also control for the characteristics of the prime contractor. It is possible that
large rms exert more inuence on project design ex post and are more likely to be able to
convince the state authorities that change orders are required. The IV provides additional
information about a rm's subcontracting needs and habits that are independent of any
unobserved complexity of the project. We nd that subcontracting leads to signicantly
higher ex-post change orders and a higher dollar renegotiation amount, supporting the view
that there is a causal link between the use of subcontractors and contract renegotiation. In
doing so we contribute to a growing literature on the indirect eects of subcontracting on
procurement auctions (Branzoli and Decarolis 2015; Marion 2015; De Silva et al. 2017).
1See page 1-137 of the VTrans Standard Specications for Construction 2011.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides a description of the data. Section 3.3
describes our model. Section 3.4 presents empirical results and section 3.5 oers concluding
remarks.
3.2 Data and Descriptive Analysis
The data used in this paper contains information on all 312 construction projects auctioned
by the Vermont Agency of Transportation between May 2004 and December 2009. Our
dataset provides information on project scope, date, duration, and cost estimates made
by state engineers prior to the auction. The engineers stipulate all items required for the
contract, and the quantities of each item. Firms provide itemized bids, from which a project-
level total bid is calculated. The state awards the contract to the lowest-bidding qualied
rm. Change orders are either adjustments in the quantity of a pre-specied material or task,
such as asphalt or roadside aggers, or the addition of a new item not originally contemplated
in the plans.2 For each change order on each project, we know the changed quantity and
unit-price for every renegotiated item within a contract. Regulation requires that change
orders be led if the changes of plans or specications impose at least a 5% increase in costs.
Nevertheless, it is the practice of Agency engineers to submit change orders whenever the
quantity of any item in a project increases by more than ten percent, even if total project
costs increase by less than the ve percent threshold.3
As shown in Table 3.1, 254 of the 312 contracts in our sample had at least one change
order. The mean number of change orders in those projects was 4.27, resulting in an average
2A special case of quantity adjustments are when the item is dropped entirely from the project. Besides
those quantity adjustments, there are some limited price adjustments applied to asphalt or fuel items when
unforeseen circumstances lead to large uctuations in the price of oil. These price adjustments are made
according to formula linked to the price indexes of those items and are beyond the discretion of the rm or
the agency. We restrict attention to change orders led for quantity adjustments.
3The engineers do this in order to avoid onerous reporting requirements if those increases are only reported
after the project is completed, rather than while it is in progress. We thank Deputy Chief Engineer Ann
Gammell for this information.
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cost increase of 7.2% over the winning bids. Over the period of analysis, VTrans spent
an average of $105,020 on renegotiations per contract. Most change orders include some
renegotiation about unanticipated tasks in the eld. The histograms presented in Figure 3.1
clearly show skewed distributions for both the number of change orders, and for the dollar
amount of the change order.
The Vermont Agency of Transportation awarded the 312 contracts to a total of 62 rms.
These rms used an average number of 5.09 subcontractors on each project. The distribution
of subcontracting use is depicted in Figure 3.2. The histogram shows the distribution of
subcontractors. The most frequent number of subcontractors is 5 or 6. Projects are relativity
likely to feature 0 or 1 subcontractors, but relatively unlikely to use 2 or 3 subcontractors.
The average project consisted of 60.2 items, 31.9 of which on average were subcontracted
out, representing 19.8% of the winning bid. Figure 3.3 presents the distribution of items
and the percentage of those completed contracts by subcontractor on projects that used at
least one subcontractor. The percentage of contracts completed by subcontractors, follows a
similar distribution to that of the number of subcontractors. The distribution of items shows
that while in most projects few items are completed by subcontractors, there is a long tail.
Both panels in this gure show that while subcontracting is an important part of highway
construction it makes up only a relatively small portion of the monetary cost of a project.
From the data on subcontracting, we create a time evolving directed network which
connects contractors to the subcontractors they used over the previous 12 months in Vermont.
An image of the network can be seen in Figure 3.4. Each node represents a rm in the
market over the full length of the dataset. Nodes are colored according to their position in
the network. Firms which worked only as contractors are represented by white nodes, while
rms which worked only as subcontractors by red. The pink nodes represent rms working
as both. Only 30 of 277 rms worked in both capacities. Nodes are adjusted in size to reect
the relative number of connections in the market while the thickness of links between nodes
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represent the number of times rms worked together. At the center of the network are a
few contractors and subcontractors who are very active in the market. In the periphery are
located rms with lower level of activity. Finally, there is a group of subcontractors that
have only been involved in one contract and are placed at the network's outermost edges.
These rms represent a large fraction of the network, with 118 out of 277 rms being used
as subcontractors only once.
From this network, we can create several variables which provide information about rm
engagement, seen at the bottom of Table 3.1. First, we represent the presence of links
between a contractor and subcontractor. Prime contractors have a strong anity to working
with subcontractors that they have already contracted with in the past. In our sample,
on each project a subcontractor has a 24.2% chance of being hired as long as the prime
contractor on that project has previously used them, whereas if they had not previously
been used that probability drops to 2.8%. The table also presents centrality measures which
attempt to ascertain a rm's importance in the directed network. For contractors, we use
the rm's outdegree centrality and hub centrality, while for subcontractors we use the rm's
indegree centrality and authority centrality. The outdegree (indegree) centrality is simply the
count of unique subcontractors (contractors) the contractor (subcontractor) has worked with.
The hub and authority centralities are more complex measures. Both use eigenvector theory
and the adjacency matrix to calculate a rm's importance in the network. Conceptually, a
contractor (subcontractor) will have a high hub (authority) centrality when it is connected
to subcontractors (contractors) with high authority (hub) centrality.4 Lastly, we use the
network to identify those rms which work both as contractors and subcontractors in the
market. These rms may behave dierently than other rms due to dierences in opportunity
costs (see Marion 2015).
4For more complete explanation of hub and authority centrality, and how they dier from out- and
indegree centrality, please see Appendix A3.2.
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Our dataset also includes information about the tasks required to complete each project
and the rms that performed these tasks as either contractors or subcontractors. These
projects consist of nearly 1000 unique jobs. We aggregate those tasks within a category,
as dened by VTrans, since tasks in the same category are typically similar and a rm
procient in one such task is likely to be competitive in the execution of other similar tasks as
well.5 After aggregation, the average project has 24.6 dierent categories. With these data,
we determine the percentage of categories, the prime contractor and subcontractors have
experience with, from the beginning of the sample to the auction date. We also determine
if a subcontractor has prociency in a category in which the winning bidder does not.
Beyond subcontracting, we include other variables relevant to renegotiation. Given Ver-
mont's varied terrain, geography is chief among these. The maps in Figure 3.5 show the
spatial distribution of contracts and their likelihood of renegotiation. There are blue and
red marks displayed on the gure that vary in size by the number of contracts procured
and renegotiated. Red marks are superimposed on the blue marks. A blue ring surrounding
a red mark shows that some contracts procured in this region have not been renegotiated.
Red marks dominate the picture as renegotiations seem to be widespread. The right panel
shows the percentage of contract value renegotiated. It is evident in this gure that the
contracts renegotiated in higher proportion are those in remote, less populated areas or in
mountainous terrain. There is a lower percentage of renegotiations on the more frequently
repaired interstate highways. This gure suggests that the frequency of renegotiation is di-
rectly related to the degree of uncertainty, because engineers face greater uncertainty with
projects in more dicult topography, and lower uncertainty on interstate projects that have
been repeated many times over the same stretch of road. Accordingly, we include variables
5Tasks are encoded as a number with the numbers before a decimal indicating the category and the
numbers after. For example, all item beginning with 201 correspond to clearing trees. Item number 201.15
corresponds to removing medium trees, 16 to large trees, etc. Vermont Agency of Transportation 2015
English/Metric Construction Manual.
52
indicating a project's elevation. We also incorporate the following project-level controls: the
engineer's cost estimate, the expected duration, the number of items, and the type of project
(highway, bridge and other).
In addition, it is necessary to control for characteristics of the prime contractor, as there
are signicant dierences in their tendency to employ subcontractors. The top rms in the
market use an average of 6.36 subcontractors per project while the remaining rms use only
3.66. Top rms also subcontracted out 25.8% of the value of their projects compared to
only 17.7% by smaller rms. Unsurprisingly the top rms are also central to the network
presented in Figure 3.4. The labels on the nodes correspond to those in Table 3.2. In
addition to information on prime contractors' use of subcontractors, we know all rms'
years of experience, their assets and liabilities. Table 3.1 provides summary statistics on
some of these variables, and Table 3.2 displays information on contract renegotiation and
subcontracting behavior by rm. Nine rms in the industry carried out more than half of
all projects, constituting approximately 76% of the total value of projects, whereas 53 fringe
rms undertook the remainder.6 Further evidence of market concentration is that one rm
undertook nearly one-fourth of all projects worth 36% of contracts. The average experience
of engineers is higher for projects awarded to top rms. In the econometric analysis, we use
a binary variable identifying top rms and a continuous variable capturing rm experience.7
A top rm designation is based on having assets in the top decile of the distribution the
year prior to the bid letting. By employing the threshold, we are able to separate rms into
groups similar to those shown in Table 3.2 and to assign a similar proportion of top rms as
in Bajari et al. (2014). Larger and more experienced contractors are more likely to undertake
6An additional 30 rms bid on projects during the period but did not win any projects.
7Firms' assets are disclosed each year prior to the renegotiation process. This information is omitted
in prior estimation results in the literature because it is often proprietary. We explored other variables
connected to rm heterogeneity, such as an indicator for those rms that won a disproportionate number of
contracts in Vermont, an indicator for rms with Vermont headquarters, and variables reecting the distance
from the rms' headquarters to the project. Those results were very similar to the results for the top rm
designation we use in this paper and are available upon request.
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more projects due to their nances and range of capabilities. We expect that they are likely
to submit more change orders as their knowledge and experience could help their chances of
renegotiation with the state government.
We measure the degree of competition in the market by using the expected number of
bidders.8 We have no priors about the expected number of bidders or the type of project. It
is possible that greater competition might lead rms to either ask for more or fewer change
orders after winning the contract. In order to test whether certain types of projects are
more susceptible to change orders, we use three binary indicators (road construction, bridge
construction and miscellaneous projects). We also include two controls for changes in the
business environment - the unemployment rate and the logarithm of the real value of all
projects auctioned o in a month. These may aect renegotiation behavior if rms submit
change orders more or less aggressively as the business environment changes.
A nal control that we employ relates to the experience of the state engineers manag-
ing the project. In practice, the resident engineer and the project manager assigned to the
project have the primary responsibility dealing with renegotiation. We measure the engi-
neer's experience by counting in how many projects an engineer has been involved over the
sample period. We then average across the resident engineer's and the project manager's
experience. Across all projects, the average experience of the resident engineer and project
manager is approximately 16 projects.
8Due to the concern of endogenous entry, we use the expected number of bidders instead of the actual
number of bidders in this analysis, considering whether the plan-holders' identities are publicly announced
prior to the letting. It is calculated using information over the past twelve months for each bidder and
planholder on the list. We construct the probability of submitting bids conditional on being a plan-holder.
For an auction at time t, the expected number of bidders is the summation of the participation probabilities.
Then, we multiply a dummy variable by the expected number of bidders in order to identify auctions in
which there are more than three qualied plan-holders on the plan-holder list. The state releases information
on plan-holders' identities only when there are more than three qualied plan-holders.
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3.3 Model and Estimation Method
In the section, we discuss the model and estimation method. N rms are observed in our
sample. A total of Pt projects are procured in period t with t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}) using a low price
sealed bid auction format. A rm that is awarded a project can subcontract part of the work
to another rm from the pool of available contractors who form a potential subcontracting
network. We describe rms' subcontracting networks by the adjacency link matrix. An
adjacency link matrix Linkpt is an N ×N matrix, whose elements depict the subcontracting
status between each pair of rms in project p in period t. We say that rm i forms a link with
rm j if the prime contractor i wins the project and subcontracts part of it to subcontractor
j. In Vermont, it is typical that these subcontracting decisions are made after the contract is
awarded. We dene Linkijpt = 1 (i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, i 6= j, p ∈ {1, ..., Pt}, t ∈
{1, 2, ..., T}), where Linkijpt is the ith and jth element of the link matrix Linkpt. If i and
j do not form a link, Linkijpt = 0. Since subcontracting is a directional relationship ( i
subcontracting to j and j subcontracting to i are dierent), the subcontracting networks
between rms are directional as well. In addition, we dene Linkiipt = 0 since rm i cannot
subcontract to itself. We also dene Linkt as the aggregation of Linkpt across all projects
in period t and Link as the aggregation of Linkt across all time periods.
In each project, we begin estimation after the state has awarded the project to the lowest
bidder, and thus all potential subcontractors can connect to a single rm. The contractor
on the project, denoted by i, then needs to determine which if any subcontractors it will
hire from the available pool, St, which includes all rms that served as a subcontractor in
Vermont in the year prior to the letting and those that are hired in the 3 months following
the project let date. To better capture all rms' subcontracting relationships, we use a
12-month moving window to track rms' subcontracting network. Dene Networkt as an
N ×N matrix, whose ith and jth element Networkijt = max{Linkijpτ : i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}, p ∈
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{1, ..., Pt}, τ ∈ {t, ..., t − 12}}. Networkt indicates whether each pair of rms has formed a
link before the current period but within the last 12-months.
Following the Bayesian estimation method rst appearing in Christakis et al. (2010) and
further developed by He and Kosmopoulou (2020), we assume that each pair of potential
prime contractors and subcontractors meet once to decide whether i forms a link with j for all
relevant projects during each period t according to some meeting order (MOt), which will be
determined endogenously in the Bayesian estimation. Our structure considers decisions made
sequentially, as opposed to simultaneously. The sequential nature of the model allows for
interdependence between the individual subcontracting decisions, creating better predictions
in our framework, while also making a less strict assumption about how decision makers
act. We then aggregate the individual decisions to arrive at a predicted project level of
subcontracting that can then be used as an IV for the number of subcontractors on a project.
A project procured in period t is relevant to potential prime contractor i if rm i submits
a bid in the project. Since a rm can be a bidder for one project and a subcontractor for
another project, the potential primes and subcontractors may include the same set of rms.
We also assume that the outcome of each meeting is known to all rms immediately after
the meeting takes place, so rms make their decisions in subsequent meetings based upon
what has already happened in the same period. We then dene MO as the aggregation of
MOt across all time periods.
The contractor i who is maximizing expected prot Ei(π
j
ipt) j = 1, ..., N at the time





ipt) ≥ 0, where Ei(π
−j
ipt) indicates the prot made by rm i if it chooses
not to hire subcontractor j and instead complete the project by itself or with previously
hired subcontractors. Likewise, subcontractor j will form a subcontracting agreement if
Ej(π
i
jpt) ≥ 0, where πijpt is the prot for rm j if it links with rm i. We assumes that utility
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is perfectly transferable between the prime contractor and a subcontractor.9 Implicitly,
this means that if a contractor has a high positive expected prot from a link, while the
subcontractor has a slightly negative expected prot, the contractor can simply pay the
subcontractor more money to make the prot of the link greater than 0 for both parties






jpt)) ≥ 0). Note that implicit in
this expected prot function are characteristics of the contractor-subcontractor relationship
and regulatory provisions that aect the likelihood of contract renegotiation as well as their
monetary consequences.
A bidder who intends to subcontract part of a project at the time of bidding faces
uncertainty about the specications of the subcontracted tasks and the size of the transfer.
Thus the probability of a change order is higher, and more expensive for subcontracted work
(Miller 2014).10 Furthermore, subcontractors often have more specialized knowledge on the
tasks that they undertake. Finally, the existence of the aforementioned 10% premium on
subcontracted work for new items added may also create incentives for primes to petition
for change orders with the intent of employing subcontractors on the added task.
We use a two-stage model to estimate the eect of subcontracting on contract renegoti-
ation. In the rst stage, we predict the probabilities of the prime contractor on a project
hiring each potential subcontractor. The model's rst stage is Bayesian so that the meeting
order of rms can vary while still making the problem mathematically tractable. Note that,
the number of potential meeting orders for a project is St!. The normalized value of the win-
ning bidder hiring a subcontractor (hereafter referred to as a link) on a project is estimated
9Christakis et al. (2010) use a dierent model for friendship link formation where both individuals must
have a positive value of friendship to create a link, but also lay out a perfectly transferable utility model, as
well as a partially transferable utility model.
10Miller takes the change order and its amount as given in his model. He estimates separate itemized bid
functions based on whether a subcontractor or contractor carries out a particular function (which must be
declared ex ante in his California sample), and then backs out cost estimates to conclude that subcontractors
are associated with higher renegotiation costs. Our approach instead endogenizes both the contracting choice
and the contract renegotiation.
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as:
log(Pr(linkijpt = 1)/(1− Pr(linkijpt = 1))) =
α · edgeijpt + β · Nijpt + γ ·Nipt + δ ·Njpt + θ · Iijpt + η ·Xipt + εijpt (3.1)
where edgeijpt is a dummy indicating if the prime contractor i worked with subcontractor j
in the previous 12 months prior to the letting of project p at time t. Nijpt is a vector of infor-
mation about the links formed on the current project including the number of subcontractors
already hired, a dummy to indicate at least one subcontractor has been hired, the number of
items previous subs have experience on, and a dummy to indicate if the subcontractor has
experience with an item neither the winning bidder nor previously hired subcontractors has
had experience with. The inclusion of the dummy for a least one subcontractor hired is to
allow for a xed cost that must be born for hiring any number of subcontractors.
Other variables included are, a vector of prime contractor network characteristics (Nipt),
a vector of potential subcontractor network characteristics (Njpt), a vector of prime con-
tractor and subcontractor item characteristics (Iijpt) and a vector of project and contractor
characteristics (Xipt) to be included in the second stage as well. All the variables and their
descriptions are listed in Table A3.1.1 in the Appendix. Finally, an error term following a
type II extreme error distribution εijpt is included, leading to a logit model.
Notice that the model is not forward looking, as rms do not directly take future sub-
contractor meetings into consideration while making current decisions. This assumption is
necessary to make the model tractable and is not uncommon in network models (see Jackson
and Watts (2001), Badev (2013), and Mele (2013)). The data provide some indirect mea-
sures of the outside options of the rms with the total number of rms in the market and
the network variables.
Since the model is Bayesian in nature it requires a prior distribution for all parameters
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and the meeting order. For both, we assume an uninformed prior. The parameters have a
prior which is normally distributed with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 100, while
the meeting order has a uniform prior.
We use a Gibbs sampler to generate the posterior distribution of the parameters, updating
parameters one at a time. For each parameter a new potential sample of the posterior is
drawn from a normal distribution centered with a mean equal to the current value.11 The
potential value is accepted if the following condition is true:
α ≤ min(1, (Pr(D|MOk,N , X; θ) · p(θ))/(Pr(D|MOk,N , X; θk) · p(θk))) (3.2)
where α is a randomly drawn number between 0 and 1, D is the observed subcontracting
outcomes, MOk is the current meeting order, N is the network information at the current
meeting order, X represents the other variables, θ is the proposed parameter set, θk is
the previous parameter set, and p(θ) is the likelihood of θ in the prior distribution. After
calculating equation (2) for all parameters, then the estimator proposes a new meeting order.
To help prevent the estimator from attempting many unlikely meeting orders, new meeting
orders are generated by reordering 1% of the subcontractors. As above, the proposed meeting
order is accepted if the following is true:
α ≤ min(1,Pr(D|MOp,N , X; θk)/Pr(D|MOk,N , X; θk)) (3.3)
where MOp is the proposed meeting order.
12 After the new meeting order is either accepted
or rejected, the process starts over with a new proposed value for the rst parameter.
To arrive at a sucient sample for the posterior distribution, we run four parallel chains
11The standard deviation for each parameter is dierent so as to increase the eciency of the sampler
because some parameters have less informed posteriors.
12There is no prior distribution for the meeting order in the equation since the meeting order is assumed
to be uniform and thus all congurations are equally likely.
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of 10,000 samples, thinned every 40 iterations and a burn-in period of 20,000 iterations.13
The individual subcontractor hiring decisions are then simulated many times using draws
from the posterior distribution of parameters and the meeting order. These decisions are
then aggregated up to the project level to arrive at the predicted level of subcontracting on
the project such that:






where ˆlinkaijpt is the a
th predicted link between contractor i to subcontractor j on project p at
time t. The predicted level of subcontracting incorporates data on the prime contractor's and
subcontractors' experiences and networks. The key variables used to estimate the instrument
are the network connections between individual rms, and their complementarities across
tasks.
In the second stage, the number of change orders is estimated using a Poisson count
model:
yipt = exp(α · subipt + β ·Xipt) + εipt (3.5)
The number of change orders (yipt) are function of the number of subcontractors on project p
used by contractor i at time t, (subipt), a vector of other project and contractor characteristics
(Xipt), and an additive error term (εipt). Xipt is assumed to be uncorrelated with the error
term, but subipt may be correlated to unobserved heterogeneity. We then use the level of
predicted subcontracting from the sequential Bayesian process described above as an IV for
actual subcontracting.
The instrumental variable thus is the predicted number of subcontractors, and the ex-
ogenous variables identifying it principally consist of contractor and subcontractor network
13Despite these eorts the eective sample size of some parameters is rather low due to autocorrelation,
especially on the variables aected by the meeting order. This is due to meeting order having a major eect
on the potential values these variables can take at a point in time, slowing movement through the posterior
distribution.
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variables. These variables are orthogonal to project complexity, conditional on the included
covariates, because rms' subcontractor networks depend upon many idiosyncratic factors,
such as cross-rm personnel relationships. It could be argued that large rms are more
likely to have large subcontractor networks and are also more likely to win bids on complex
projects. For that reason, we include rm size as a covariate in each stage of our estimation
procedure. Thus, the resulting predicted number of subcontractors is orthogonal to this in-
uence. Furthermore, much of the predictive power is from subcontractor-centered network
measures, rather than prime contractor-centered network measures (see the discussion of
Table 3.3 that follows). In our dataset, the network density of individual subcontractors is
strongly inuenced by local market structure, which is driven at least in part by xed costs
and entry barriers. An example noted by VTrans engineers is the fact that in Vermont there
are only three rms that conduct work on guardrails, which is not an item especially associ-
ated with project complexity. The subcontractors conducting guardrail work have indegree
and authority centrality measures 4 times that of other subcontractors (For indegree 7.56 vs
1.99 and for authority 0.024 vs 0.005). In a similar vein, the edge variable, capturing whether
rms were linked together in the last year, also represents connections to specialized subcon-
tractors responsible for non-complex task, such as guardrails, agging, or line painting. For
each of these reasons, we believe there is no relationship between the instrumental variable
and unobserved complexity.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
The rst step in our econometric investigation is to predict the individual subcontracting
decisions as described in Equation 3.1. These results can be seen in Table 3.3. In addition
to the sequential Bayesian model presented in Column 1, two simultaneous specications are
shown - a traditional maximum likelihood logit model in Column 2, and a Bayesian logit
61
model in Column 3. Both assume each subcontracting decision is made independently. A
total of 28,678 potential subcontractor options across 273 projects are used as data. The
rst four variables appear only in the sequential model, as they indicate how the next sub-
contracting decision depends upon previous ones. It is immediately evident that there are
interdependencies among subcontracting decisions as evidenced by the rst four point es-
timates. First, contractors are more reluctant to hire additional subcontractors the more
subcontractors they have already hired. There is a divergence of the pattern with an in-
creased likelihood of hiring a second subcontractor after the rst. This change, after the
rst subcontractor is hired, is dramatic. Evaluating the model at the means, the probability
that a particular subcontractor is hired is 0.5% when no others have previously been hired.
After the rst subcontractor is hired though the probability rises to 4% for the second. It
may be more costly for rms to hire the rst subcontractor than subsequent ones, perhaps
because of a xed cost of subcontracting management that is spread across all subcontractors
on a project. Additionally, the range of jobs previously hired subcontractors can perform
decreases the likelihood of the next subcontractor being hired, while a subcontractor that is
able to ll a gap in the project is more likely to be hired. Together the sequential assumption
and the additional variables lead to a substantial improvement of the model over the two
simultaneous specications. The simulated pseudo R2 is 0.388 in the sequential model com-
pared to 0.350 in the maximum likelihood model.14 The increased predictive power comes
from improved predictions by the sequential model of the number of subcontractors used in
larger projects. As the sequential model includes additional control variables it more closely
replicates the observed patterns of subcontracting making it a more ecient instrument
14Simulated log likelihood and pseudo R2 is calculated by simulating 16,000 dierent outcomes using 800
parameter sets and meeting orders from the posterior distribution, and taking the average. The simulated log
likelihood is then calculated as
N∑
i=1
yipt · log((1/A) ·
A∑
a=1
ŷaipt)+(1−yipt) · log(1−(1/A) ·
A∑
a=1
ŷaipt), where yipt is
the realized subcontracting outcome, ŷaipt is a simulated outcome, and A is the total number of simulations.
The simulated pseudo R2 is calculated by taking the dierence between simulated log likelihood and a the
log likelihood for a constant-only model and dividing it by the log likelihood for a constant-only model.
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overall.
In both the sequential and simultaneous models, the variables describing contractor-
subcontractor networks are important predictors of linkages. Specically, the outdegree,
indegree and authority network measures are all statistically signicant with similar mag-
nitudes across all models. Well connected subcontractors, those with high indegree and
authority centrality, are more likely to be hired. The extension of a prime's network, repre-
sented by their outdegree centrality, reduces the probability that any given subcontractor will
be hired, which is logical given that those primes with large networks have a greater number
of attractive options. Not surprisingly, given the regulatory requirements, the DBE status
of a subcontractor increases the probability that they are hired.15 The results also support
the hypothesis that the number of items a subcontractor has experience with increases the
likelihood that they are hired, but as the signicance and magnitude of the quadratic term
indicates, this eect rapidly tails o.
Most shared parameters between the simulations and sequential models have similar signs
and magnitudes, but three have a substantial dierence, that can be attributed to the model.
First, the log number of subcontractors in the market is insignicant in the sequential model
but negative and signicant in the simultaneous models. With previously hired subcontrac-
tors included in the sequential model, available subcontractors become unimportant. Second,
subcontractors that ll a gap in the prime contractor's skill set are more likely to be hired
in the simultaneous model and less likely in the sequential model. This is because of the
addition, in the sequential model, of the dummy indicating that a subcontractor lls a gap
in both the contractor and previously hired subs skill sets. Thus, in the sequential model
the interpretation of the coecient is dierent, as it signals that the subcontractor may have
skills that were previously been contracted for. Third, in the sequential model the coecient
15VTrans is required to meet annual goals for DBE usage, but it does not set specic requirements at the
project level.
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of top rms although smaller, becomes statistically signicant at the 1% level because its
standard error falls dramatically. This is likely due to the inclusion of the additional variables
in the sequential model that permit a more precise estimation of the eect of top rms.
As mentioned before, the sequential model oers an improved prediction for the indi-
vidual subcontracting decisions, but equally important is how it predicts the number of
subcontractors on a project. Figure 3.6 illustrates how the dierent models' predicted dis-
tributions compare with the observed distribution of subcontracting. Neither simultaneous
model captures the behavior near 0 and has subcontractor usage fall o more slowly past
the peak. The sequential model does a superior job on both fronts. The model features a
spike at zero before dropping o, rising and then falling o quickly again. The model is still
imperfect - it overpredicts no subcontractor use, and underpredicts a single used contractor
but oers an improvement at the project level.
We use these estimations of the link probabilities to construct ˆsub, as noted in equation
4. That variable is then included in the estimation of the actual level of subcontracting,
from which we derive the instrument. It is clear that the sequential model also performs well
predicting subcontractor usage for individual projects, seen in Table 3.4. All three models
provide information left out by the other control variables and are signicant at the 1%
level. Still, the sequential model outperforms the other two with a coecient close to 1
in the specications where predictive subcontracting enters on its own (Columns 1, 3, and
5). In the univariate model, the sequentially predicted subcontracting explains 58.2% of the
variation in actual subcontractor use, better than the 54.9% from the simultaneous models.
The only control variables with statistically signicant coecients (at the ten percent level
or better) are the project's number of items and the top rm dummy.16
16An alternative specication to Table 3.4, that uses the percentage of the project value subcontracted as
a dependent variable is presented in Table A3.4.1 in the appendix. In this specication, we use a quadratic
form for the predicted number of subcontracts, because the marginal subcontractor is used less than the
average. The results show a strong quadratic relationship with each additional subcontractor hired doing a
smaller portion of the work than the previous one.
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Next, we examine how subcontracting aects the number of change orders. The results,
presented in Table 3.5, are obtained using the generalized method of moments (GMM) esti-
mator. The rst column presents a Poisson regression with no instrument for the number of
subcontractors. Here, an increase in the number of subcontractors increases the likelihood of
additional change orders, but the nding cannot be interpreted as causal because the num-
ber of subcontractors may be correlated with unobserved project complexity not captured
by other controls. As such, we instrument for it in Column 2 using the predicted level of
subcontracting from Table 3.4, Column 2. The coecient on the number of subcontractors
increases in magnitude and remains statistically signicant. One might expect that the co-
ecient would become smaller because unobserved complexity was introducing a positive
bias on the subcontracting coecient in Column 1. However, coecients of some control
variables are sensitive to the inclusion of the IV especially the log of the engineering cost
estimate and the number of items. This suggested that prior to the inclusion of the IV the
coecients of those variables reected confounding eects.17 Evaluated at the mean level
of the control variables, a project with 5 subcontractors will have 2.52 change orders, but
increasing the number of subcontractors to 6 will lead to a 0.45 increase in change orders.18
This amounts to an elasticity of 0.89 at the means. We also use predicted subcontractors,
from Table 3.3 Column 1, as a proxy variable for subcontractors in Column 3 and nd similar
results.19
Other observable characteristics also raise the likelihood of renegotiation. The project's
duration, number of items, and engineers estimate all have positive signs in Column 1,
17It is not uncommon for 2SLS estimates to be larger than OLS even when selection pressures would
suggest the OLS estimate is overestimated. For example, larger eects have recently been found in a study
of the impact of air pollution on trac accidents (Sager 2019).
18One additional subcontractor on a project with 2 and another with 8 subcontractors will lead to an
additional 0.38 and 1.04 change orders respectively.
19We also run a normalized version of these regressions in Table A3.4.2. To do this we divide the number
of change orders by the number of items since that is the level of renegotiation. We nd that each additional
subcontractor leads to an extra 1.8% of items to be renegotiated.
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which is unsurprising as all three are related to the complexity of the project. As expected,
the elevation of the project's location is a signicant predictor of renegotiation, though
the eect fades as the elevation squared has a negative eect. None of the other variables
have statistically signicant coecients, including the dummy designating large rms and
experience of either the rm or the engineers. 20
Recall that, change orders may either be for new added items that were not included
in the original plans, or merely for adjustments in the quantities of items that were in the
plans. It is plausible that change orders consisting of quantity adjustments, are more likely
caused by the coordination costs between a contractor and its subcontractors than change
orders which add brand new items to a project. Following this line of reasoning, we estimate
our specication in a subsample of projects that only have quantity adjustments. These
results are displayed in Columns 4 through 6 of Table 3.5. The coecient on the number of
subcontractors is of similar magnitude as in the full sample and is statistically signicant at
the 1% level. The fact that the coeent on the restricted sample, without new items added,
is similar in magnitude to that in the full sample, supports the view that coordination costs,
rather than the special 10% premium on subcontracted new items, is ultimately driving the
result. Again evaluating the marginal increase from 5 subcontractors to 6, for a project at
the means of the controls leads to an increase of 0.429 additional change orders.21
Lastly, we estimate the factors inuencing the costliness of change orders. In Table
3.6, we present the ordinary least squares and IV regression estimates with the dependent
variable being the dollar value of change order costs. The costs measured here are those that
appear on the invoice. Because rms are likely to add premia to their bids in anticipation
20We also used a propensity score method to test for dierences between the likelihood of renegotiation
between large and small rms as the two groups may win dierent types of projects. Matching on expected
duration, number of items, engineers' cost estimates, all factors encompassing uncertainty, and engineer
experience, we found no signicant dierence in the number of change orders. Those results are available
upon request.
21A marginal increase from 2 to 3 subcontractors adds 0.29 change orders, while a change from 8 to 9 lead
to an additional 0.64 change orders.
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of possible adaptation costs that might occur as a result of change orders, the change order
invoice contains elements of direct and adaptation costs.
Our estimation of the determinants of cost produces results that are similar to those
of the count models. As with change orders, the number of subcontractors is a signicant
predictor of cost overruns, albeit at the 10% level. With the inclusion of the IV, the point
estimate rises and remains signicant. The results in Column 2 of Table 3.6 suggest that each
additional subcontractor on a project adds $48,000 in readjustment costs.22 Other important
determinants of the renegotiation costs are the project duration, the engineer's cost estimate
and the paving project dummy.23 We also run the same regressions on renegotiation costs
normalized by the engineer's estimate and log dollar value renegotiated.24 These regressions
again suggest that the number of subcontractors leads to more costly renegotiations, though
the coecient is not statistically signicant in the log regression.25 For the normalized
regression the results suggest that each additional subcontractor raises costs by 1.8% of the
engineer's estimate, which for the average project size of $1.9 million would be $34,000. The
lower eect size in these two specication may be because subcontracting disproportionately
aects smaller projects, while the log and normalized specications imply the opposite. State
regulations dictate that change orders should be implemented only if the unanticipated costs
exceed 5% of the project's value, so small projects are more likely to require renegotiation.
Finally, one potential area of concern is that rms with large subcontractor networks may
systematically choose projects that are more prone to change orders. If that is the case, sub-
contracting networks may aect the incidence of change orders through a channel other than
22We carry out a Hausman test that the point estimates in OLS and the IV are equal, and we reject that
hypothesis at the 10% level.
23Paving projects have an automatic readjustment mechanism for asphalt costs caused by uctuations in
the price of oil, one of its major inputs.
24For regressions normalized by the engineer's estimate we do not include the engineer's estimate as a
control variable. For regressions with log dollar value renegotiated, 6 projects have a negative value of
renegotiation those observations are lost because of the log transformation.
25The marginal impact at 2, 5, and 8 subcontractors is $515, $4,694, and $42,700 respectively.
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the network's inuence on the number of subcontractors employed. As an additional check,
we estimate the number of change orders, and the renegotiation amount in a specication
that includes both the instrument and the network variables entered independently in addi-
tion to the other controls. We nd that the coecients on these network variables are small
and statistically insignicant which we interpret as evidence that the network variables are
only important for change orders through their inuence on the number of subcontractors.
We oer evidence in Appendix A3.3, Table A3.3.1.
3.5 Conclusion
Our analysis demonstrates that the number of subcontractors on a project is a powerful pre-
dictor of the likelihood of contract renegotiation and their nancial importance. We estimate
that each subcontractor on a project leads to 0.45 additional change orders and adds $48,000
to costs. We employ an instrumental variable - the predicted number of subcontractors -
that depends on network variables. These network variables, conditional on control variables
that we include such as rm size, are orthogonal to unobserved project complexity, and are
therefore crucial for establishing the validity of our IV. As a consequence, our estimates of
the eect of subcontractors on change orders are of a direct causal impact. Therefore, our
paper provides new evidence in support of the hypothesis that coordination costs and other
transaction costs associated with subcontracting can lead to contract renegotiations (Masten
et al. 1991; Miller 2014).
Our conversations with Vermont Agency of Transportation ocials oer important con-
text for our results. It is often the case the prime contractors limit the information about
the project that they share with subcontractors, and that this has the potential to lead to
miscommunication and coordination failures. A possible policy implication of our nding is
that the Transportation Agency could mandate more complete information sharing up front.
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This could preempt coordination problems to a degree and obviate the need for some change
orders. Nevertheless, prime contractors may be reluctant to share full information with sub-
contractors because it is costly to do so. It also could be the case that prime contractors feel
that more extensive information sharing could reveal private information about their costs
or capabilities that could compromise their competitive position. Given that many subcon-
tractors are also prime contractors in their own right, or deal with other prime contractors
as well, this is a very real concern. Agencies may wish to conduct experiments with dierent
information-sharing protocols in order to determine the extent of any unintended negative
consequences. Finally, letting agencies might debrief separately subcontractors and prime
contractors ex post on projects that result in unusually large numbers of change orders.
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Figure 1.1: Monte Carlo Simulation with Overlapping Subcontractors and Symmetric Means
Panels show the relationship between a measure of similarity and the correlation between the private
values of 2 contractors. The top row uses jaccard similarity, the middle uses cosine similarity, and the
bottom uses the overlap count. Each column uses a dierent underlying distribution for the subcon-
tractors. From left to right they are a uniform distribution, normal distribution, logistic distribution,
chi-squared distribution, and negative chi-Squared distribution. R2 values of a quadratic t line are
shown below each panel.
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Figure 1.2: Contractor-Subcontractor Network: Four Slices
(a) January 2005 (b) April 2007
(c) September 2009 (d) December 2011
Potential Bidders are shown in red. Subcontractors that were never potential bidders are shown in
light blue. Node location is constant in all 4 slices. The links are directed from potential bidders to
subcontractors, using information on subcontracting from the prior 12 months. Node size varies based
on the maximum of hub and authority centrality at that time. All images are constructed using Gephi.
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Figure 1.3: Subcontractor Network Similarity Histograms
(a) Planholder Pair: Overlap (b) Potential Planholder Pair: Overlap
(c) Planholder Pair: Jaccard Similarity (d) Potential Planholder Pair: Jaccard Similarity
(e) Planholder Pair: Cosine Similarity (f) Potential Planholder Pair: Cosine Similarity
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Chapter 2 Figures
Figure 2.1: Family Sales
(a) Price Density by Seller Identication (b) Count of Sales by Seller Identication
In Panel A, The blue dashed line represents the price density of pieces sold by sellers who's names match
the artist's. The solid red line represents pieces sold by all other sellers. In Panel B, the red bars represent
pieces sold by family sellers in a given year, while the blue bars represent those works sold by others.
Figure 2.2: Distributional Posthumous Eect on Log Price
(a) Unconditional Eect (b) Conditional Eect
Panel A captures distributional posthumous eects on log price corresponding to estimates in Panel A of
Table 3. Panel B captures distributional posthumous eects corresponding to estimates in Panel B of Table
3. The solid lines are the point estimate for each quanitle. The shaded regions represent the bootstrapped
95% condence interval from 1000 repetitions.
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Figure 2.3: All Quantiles: Network Eects
(a) Artist: Log Egienvector Centrality (b) Seller: Family
Panel A captures the artist's log eigenvector centrality eects corresponding to estimates in Panel B of
Table 3. Panel B captures the eect of family sales corresponding to estimates in Panel B of Table 3. The
solid lines are the point estimate for each quanitle. The shaded regions represent the bootstrapped 95%
condence interval from 1000 repetitions.
Figure 2.4: All Quantiles: Prices changes after death
(a) ≤ 2 Years after Death (b) 2-10 Years after Death (c) 10-20 Years after Death
Panels A, B and C capture price change in three bins following death, instead of using a continuous time
trend. Panel A includes works sold between 0 and 2 years after death, B includes works sold 2 to 10 years
after death and C includes works sold 10 to 20 years after death. The solid lines are the point estimate for
each quantile. The shaded regions represent the bootstrapped 95% condence interval.
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Figure 2.5: All Quantiles: Network at Death
(a) ≤ 2 Years after Death (b) 2-10 Years after Death (c) 10-20 Years after Death
Panels A, B and C capture log eigenvector centrality eects corresponding to estimates in Panels A, B and
C of Table 4 respectively. The solid lines are the point estimate for each quanitle. The shaded regions
represent the 95% condence interval.
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Figure 2.6: Artist comparison
(a) J.M.W. Turner
(b) Horatio McCulloch
The black line shows the log eigenvector centrality of each artist from 20 year before his death, to 20 years
after. The vertical red line indicates the year each artist died. The dots show log prices of pieces sold. The
blue dots are pieces bought by dealers and the red dots those bought by others. The dots are scaled to the
square root of the buyers eigenvector centrality.
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Chapter 3 Figures
Figure 3.1: Histograms of the Number of Change Orders and the Cost of Change Order
Figure 3.2: Number of Subcontractors by Project
Figure 3.3: Histograms of the Subcontractor Items and Percentage of Winning Bid completed by
Subcontractors
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Figure 3.4: Contractor-Subcontractor Network
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Figure 3.5: Project Locations and Change Orders in the Vermont Highway Construction Industry

















































Table 1.1: Auction Variable: Summary Statistics
Auction Variables Mean Median Std dev
Total Bidder 4.31 4 2.141
Total Planholders 7.19 7 3.04
Total Potential Planholders 23.66 24 8.114
Plan Cost 22.3 11.9 25.6
Engineer's Estimate ($1000) 1,136 529 1,625
Contract Days 140 120 61.8
Project Items 45.7 35 28.4
DBE Goal (%) 2.74 3 2.80
OK Unemployment Rate 5.15 4.6 1.23
Observations 516
The Oklahoma Unemployment Rate is taken from the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics. All other data comes from ODOT
bridge and approach contracts from 2005 to 2011.
Table 1.2: Potential Bidder: Summary Statistics
Planholders Potential Planholders
Mean Median Std dev Mean Median Std dev
Bidder 0.621 1 0.485 0.202 0 0.401
Planholder 1 1 0 0.325 0 0.468
Distance from job site (mi) 91.58 78.11 67.35 129.5 112.6 88.61
Backlog ($1000) 767.4 428.4 894.8 760.8 350.0 982.4
Outdegree Centrality 18.33 16 11.94 16.03 14 11.20
Hub Centrality 0.025 0.020 0.018 0.021 0.016 0.016
Horizontal Subcontractor 0.499 0 0.500 0.512 1 0.500
Observations 3,093 9,524
All data comes from ODOT bridge and approach contracts from 2005 to 2011. Firms
with no subcontracting connections are dropped.
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Table 1.3: Potential Bidder Pair: Summary Statistics
Planholder Pair Potential Planholder Pair
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev
Subcontractor Overlap 4.557 3 4.147 3.253 2 3.346
Jaccard Similarity 0.132 0.116 0.089 0.103 0.091 0.078
Cosine Similarity 0.250 0.243 0.134 0.201 0.199 0.124
Observations 9,471 91,497
All data comes from ODOT bridge and approach contracts from 2005 to 2011. Firms
with no subcontracting connections are dropped. Each observation is a potential
bidder pair in an auction.
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Table 1.4: Planholder Bid Decision
Standard Constant Jaccard Cosine Overlap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ρ1 0.024 0.069 0.001
(0.207) (0.135) (0.005)
ρ0 -0.016 -0.019 -0.033 -0.022
(0.016) (0.032) (0.037) (0.027)
Potential Bidders -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.048***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Log Estimate -0.105 -0.105 -0.106 -0.108 -0.107
(0.069) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067)
Log Working Days 0.131 0.135 0.136 0.138 0.137
(0.103) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100)
Log Items -0.253** -0.254** -0.253** -0.250** -0.252**
(0.115) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112)
DBE Goal -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.09)
Time Trend 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
OK Unemployment 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.116***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Distance (100 mi) -0.224*** -0.223*** -0.222*** -0.222*** -0.222***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Backlog ($mill) -0.026 -0.029 -0.029 -0.028 -0.028
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Outdegree Centrality -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Hub Centrality (X100) 0.153*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.151***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Horizontal Sub -0.058 -0.056 -0.056 -0.056 -0.057
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Log Likelihood -1962.6 -1962.2 -1962.2 -1962.0 -1962.1
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044
A standard probit regression is shown in Column 1. The results of the replication of
Li and Zhang (2010) on ODOT data are seen in Column 2. Columns 3, 4, and 5 allow
aliation between rms to vary according to their jaccard similarities, cosine similarities
and number of overlapping subcontractors respectively. Columns 2 through 4 use 400
simulation and nite dierences to estimate derivatives. Standard errors are shown in
parenthesis. * indicates signicance at the 10% level, ** signicance at the 5% level,
and *** signicance at the 1% level.
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Table 1.5: Potential Planholder Buy Decision
Standard Constant Jaccard Cosine Overlap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ρ1 0.462*** 0.348*** 0.006***
(0.080) (0.054) (0.002)
ρ0 0.031*** -0.014 -0.034*** 0.013
(0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010)
Potential Bidders -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log Plan Cost 0.113*** 0.112** 0.111** 0.111** 0.105**
(0.040) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Log Working Days 0.328*** 0.332*** 0.310*** 0.302*** 0.318***
(0.056) (0.064) (0.065) (0.066) (0.065)
Log Items -0.388*** -0.386*** -0.369*** -0.364*** -0.384***
(0.071) (0.081) (0.082) (0.083) (0.081)
DBE Goal -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Time Trend 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
OK Unemployment 0.157*** 0.158*** 0.142*** 0.138*** 0.146***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Distance (100 mi) -0.630*** -0.639*** -0.626*** -0.623*** -0.636***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
Backlog ($ mill) -0.106*** -0.105*** -0.103*** -0.100*** -0.103***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Outdegree Centrality -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.017***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Hub Centrality (X100) 0.238*** 0.247*** 0.246*** 0.240*** 0.247***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Horizontal Sub -0.066** -0.071** -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.074**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Log Likelihood -5230.5 -5221.1 -5204.5 -5199.5 -5217.0
Pseudo R2 0.129 0.130 0.133 0.134 0.131
A standard probit regression is shown in Column 1. The results of the replication of
Li and Zhang (2010) on ODOT data are seen in Column 2. Columns 3, 4, and 5 allow
aliation between rms to vary according to their jaccard similarities, cosine similarities
and number of overlapping subcontractors respectively. Columns 2 through 4 use 700
simulation and nite dierences are used to estimate derivatives. Standard errors are
shown in parenthesis. * indicates signicance at the 10% level, ** signicance at the 5%
level, and *** signicance at the 1% level.
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Table 1.6: Bidding Behavior
Standard Constant Jaccard Cosine Overlap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ρ1 0.377*** 0.329*** 0.013***
(0.132) (0.087) (0.003)
ρ0 0.166*** 0.373*** 0.341*** 0.365***
(0.003) (0.030) (0.033) (0.027)
Potential Bidders -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log Engineer's Estimate 0.921*** 0.920*** 0.921*** 0.921*** 0.920***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Log Working Days 0.079*** 0.084*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.093 ***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Log Items 0.128*** 0.123*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.115***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
DBE Goal -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Time Trend 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
OK Unemployment -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Distance (100 mi) 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Backlog ($ mill) -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Outdegree Centrality 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Hub Centrality -1.114* -1.008* -0.893* -0.881* -0.991**
(0.588) (0.531) (0.489) (0.484) (0.483)
Horizontal Sub 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.008
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Pseudo R2 0.970 0.975 0.977 0.977 0.977
The results use a Bayesian method to capture aliation between bids. A Standard re-
gression is done in Column 1. General aliation is tested for in Column 2. Columns 3, 4,
and 5 allow aliation between rms to vary according to their jaccard similarities, cosine
similarities and number of overlapping subcontractors respectively. Posterior distribution
standard deviations are shown in parenthesis. * indicates signicance at the 10% level, **
signicance at the 5% level, and *** signicance at the 1% level.
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Table 1.7: Planholder Bid Decision: Windows
Constant Jaccard Cosine Overlap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: 6-month window
ρ1 -0.245 -0.070 -0.013**
(0.245) (0.149) (0.007)
ρ0 -0.009 0.020 0.006 0.032
(0.018) (0.035) (0.038) (0.029)
Log Likelihood -1863.7 -1863.2 -1863.6 -1861.9
Pseudo R2 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.039
Panel B: 18-month window
ρ1 -0.166 -0.100 -0.002
(0.186) (0.125) (0.003)
ρ0 -0.025* -0.002 0.001 -0.016
(0.015) (0.030) (0.036) (0.025)
Log Likelihood -1949.7 -1949.3 -1949.4 -1949.6
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051
The results use the same regressors and methods as Table 1.4.
Panel A has 560 auctions, 2,945 planholders, and 7,803 plan-
holder pairs. Panel B has 493 auctions, 3,087 planholders,
and 9,846 planholder pairs. General aliation is tested for in
Column 1. Columns 2, 3, and 4 allow aliation between rms
to vary according to their jaccard similarities, cosine similar-
ities and number of overlapping subcontractors respectively.
Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. * indicates signif-
icance at the 10% level, ** signicance at the 5% level, and
*** signicance at the 1% level.
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Table 1.8: Potential Planholder Buy Decision: Windows
Constant Jaccard Cosine Overlap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: 6-month window
ρ1 0.202** 0.158*** 0.001
(0.093) (0.059) (0.003)
ρ0 0.035*** 0.016 0.007 0.033***
(0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012)
Log Likelihood -4815.6 -4813.1 -4811.8 -4815.5
Pseudo R2 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.137
Panel B: 18-month window
ρ1 0.451*** 0.358*** 0.005***
(0.078) (0.054) (0.002)
ρ0 0.028*** -0.017 -0.041*** 0.008
(0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
Log Likelihood -5329.1 -5312.4 -5305.9 -5323.6
Pseudo R2 0.129 0.132 0.133 0.130
The results use all the same regressors and methods as Table 1.5.
Panel A has 562 auctions, 8,722 potential planholders, and 69,552
potential planholder pairs. Panel B has 494 auctions, 9,836 po-
tential planholders, and 101,901 potential planholder pairs. Gen-
eral Aliation is tested for in Column 1. Columns 2, 3, and 4
allow aliation between rms to vary according to their jaccard
similarities, cosine similarities and number of overlapping subcon-
tractors respectively. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
* indicates signicance at the 10% level, ** signicance at the 5%
level, and *** signicance at the 1% level.
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Table 1.9: Planholder Bid Decision: No Network
Constant Jaccard Cosine Overlap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ρ1 0.035 0.069 0.001
(0.206) (0.135) (0.004)
ρ2 -0.040 -0.027 -0.040
(0.063) (0.066) (0.060)
ρ3 0.005** 0.005** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ρ4 0.162* 0.175* 0.163*
(0.095) (0.097) (0.093)
ρ0 0.002 -0.023 -0.035 -0.023
(0.014) (0.032) (0.037) (0.026)
Log Likelihood -2357.0 -2352.5 -2352.4 -2352.5
Pseudo R2 0.056 0.057 0.058 0.057
The expands the results of Table 1.4 to incorporate rms
with no observed network. This leads to an increased sample
size of 516 auctions, 3,709 planholders, and 13,861 planholder
pairs. General Aliation is tested for in Column 1. Columns
2, 3, and 4 allow aliation between rms to vary according
to their jaccard similarities, cosine similarities and number
of overlapping subcontractors respectively. The number of
simulations used increases to 450. Standard errors are shown
in parenthesis. * indicates signicance at the 10% level, **
signicance at the 5% level, and *** signicance at the 1%
level.
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Table 1.10: Potential Planholder Buy Decision: No Net-
work
Constant Jaccard Cosine Overlap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ρ1 0.546*** 0.418*** 0.008***
(0.077) (0.054) (0.002)
ρ2 0.038** 0.062*** 0.005
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017)
ρ3 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ρ4 0.104*** 0.126*** 0.075***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026)
ρ0 0.030*** -0.026** -0.049*** 0.004
(0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
Log Likelihood -6624.0 -6597.1 -6589.8 -6613.8
Pseudo R2 0.116 0.120 0.121 0.118
The expands the results of Table 1.5 to incorporate rms with
no observed network. This leads to an increased sample size of
516 auctions, 12,209 potential planholders, and 155,286 potential
planholder pairs. General Aliation is tested for in Column 1.
Columns 2, 3, and 4 allow aliation between rms to vary accord-
ing to their jaccard similarities, cosine similarities and number of
overlapping subcontractors respectively. The number of simula-
tions used increases to 800. Standard errors are shown in paren-
thesis.* indicates signicance at the 10% level, ** signicance at
the 5% level, and *** signicance at the 1% level.
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Table 1.11: Planholder Bid Decision: Weighted Network
Constant Jaccard Cosine Overlap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ρ1 0.295 0.105 -0.012
(0.426) (0.222) (0.040)
ρ0 -0.016 -0.025 -0.024 -0.013
(0.016) (0.021) (0.024) (0.019)
Outdegree ($mil) 0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 0.014**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Hub Centrality -1.237 -1.265 -1.265 -1.216
(0.980) (0.982) (0.982) (0.982)
Log Likelihood -1985.6 -1985.4 -1985.5 -1985.6
Pseudo R2 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.033
The expands the results of Table 1.4 to dollar weights to rm's
network. General Aliation is tested for in Column 1. Columns
2, 3, and 4 allow aliation between rms to vary according to
their jaccard similarities, cosine similarities and number of over-
lapping subcontractors respectively. Standard errors are shown
in parenthesis. * indicates signicance at the 10% level, ** sig-
nicance at the 5% level, and *** signicance at the 1% level.
Table 1.12: Potential Planholder Buy Decision: Weighted
Network
Constant Jaccard Cosine Overlap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ρ1 0.468*** 0.505*** 0.010
(0.104) (0.073) (0.010)
ρ0 0.025*** 0.013 -0.004 0.023
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Outdegree ($mil) -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Hub Centrality -0.652 -0.647 -0.663 -0.628
(0.553) (0.559) (0.561) (0.556)
Log Liklihood -5346.2 -5338.1 -5324.5 -5345.7
Pseudo R2 0.110 0.111 0.113 0.110
The expands the results of Table 1.5 to dollar weights to rm's
network. General Aliation is tested for in Column 1. Columns 2,
3, and 4 allow aliation between rms to vary according to their
jaccard similarities, cosine similarities and number of overlapping
subcontractors respectively. Standard errors are shown in paren-
thesis. * indicates signicance at the 10% level, ** signicance at
the 5% level, and *** signicance at the 1% level.
95
Chapter 2 Tables
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Before Death After Death
Varriable Mean / Count STD Mean / Count STD
Number of Pieces Sold 3,127 4,633
Number of Unique Artists 160 160
Number of Unique Buyers 647 946
Number of Unique Sellers 716 929
Number of Unknown Sales 381 516
Price 381.7 508.1 355.2 596.0
Average Number of Bidders in an Auction 40.19 19.56 42.11 20.92
Artist: Eigenvector Centrality 0.005 0.006 0.011 0.018
Artist: Number of Art Sold 30.59 33.07 43.04 42.4
Buyer: Eigenvector Centrality 0.024 0.038 0.024 0.038
Buyer: Capacity 11,095 16154 12000 17,974
Buyer: Dealer 0.664 0.473 0.627 0.484
Artist-Buyer Link 0.481 0.500 0.511 0.500
Seller: Family 0.007 0.084 0.129 0.336
Seller's Past Volume 3.82 14.68 3.176 12.51
Unknown Seller 0.122 0.327 0.111 0.315
Christie's Dummy 0.967 0.179 0.942 0.233
Before Death includes pieces sold at auction from 20 years prior to death. After Death includes
pieces sold at auction till 20 years after death. Source: Authors' calculation.
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Table 2.2: Buyer Likelihood to Purchase Artwork at Auc-
tion
Dealers Others All
Variable of Interest (1) (2) (3)
Posthumous -0.008 -0.001 0.018
(0.050) (0.054) (0.037)
Artist: Log Eigenvector -0.003 -0.020*** -0.009*
Centrality (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Artist: Log # of Art Sold -0.036** 0.028* -0.011
(0.015) (0.016) (0.011)
Buyer: Log Eigenvector 0.078*** -0.005 0.043***
Centrality (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Buyer: Log Capacity 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.059***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Artist-Buyer Link 0.566*** 0.530*** 0.572***
(0.019) (0.029) (0.015)
Seller: Family -0.001 0.038 -0.004
(0.037) (0.037) (0.026)
Seller: Unknown -0.108*** 0.137*** -0.012
(0.025) (0.025) (0.018)
Seller: Log Past Sales -0.025* 0.038** 0.000
(0.013) (0.015) (0.010)
Max Rival: Log -0.188*** 0.002 -0.129***
Eigenvector (0.015) (0.013) (0.019)
Max Rival: Log -0.115*** 0.004 -0.109***
Capacity (0.020) (0.019) (0.013)
Mean Rival: Artist-Buyer -0.658*** -0.399*** -0.551***
Link (0.116) (0.129) (0.086)
Artist: Contemporary 0.043* -0.041 0.004
British (0.022) (0.025) (0.016)
Observations 110,217 206,295 316,512
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.147 0.068 0.137
Each observation is a bidder at an auction who may buy a paint-
ing. Column 1 includes only the bidders who were art dealers. Col-
umn 2 includes only the bidders who were not art dealers. Column
3 looks at the full sample. All columns incorporates other control
variables as well, including log number of buyers, log number of
painting for sale, a dealers capacity, dummies for an artwork's
medium and genre. Source: Authors' calculation.
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Table 2.3: Distributional Posthumous Eect on Log Price
Quantiles(τ)
Variables of Interest Mean 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Panel A. Without Controls
Posthumous -0.120*** -0.009 -0.130*** -0.198*** -0.215*** -0.180***
(0.026) (0.021) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.038)
Controls No No No No No No
Artist Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B. With Controls and Sample Selection
Posthumous -0.007 0.085 -0.031 -0.052 -0.046 0.036
(0.047) (0.130) (0.105) (0.087) (0.115) (0.145)
Artist: Log Eigenvector 0.084*** 0.062** 0.085*** 0.096*** 0.072*** 0.042***
Centrality (0.012) (0.042) (0.034) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032)
Artist: No Network -0.981*** -0.684** -0.917*** -1.116*** -0.944** -0.636**
(0.147) (0.439) (0.343) (0.330) (0.364) (0.444)
Artist: Log Number of -0.050** 0.008 -0.017 -0.095* -0.095** -0.090*
Art Sold (0.027) (0.095) (0.070) (0.058) (0.058) (0.069)
Buyer: Log Eigenvector -0.054*** -0.022 -0.034 -0.033 -0.053 -0.067
Centrality (0.008) (0.064) (0.049) (0.045) (0.044) (0.061)
Buyer: No Network 0.731*** 0.404 0.544* 0.536** 0.671** 0.705**
(0.079) (0.504) (0.389) (0.313) (0.359) (0.429)
Buyer: Log Capacity 0.269*** 0.158*** 0.186*** 0.215*** 0.272** 0.302**
(0.014) (0.047) (0.038) (0.038) (0.058) (0.086)
Buyer: Dealer -0.194*** -0.165 -0.132 -0.195 -0.176* -0.207*
(0.031) (0.202) (0.166) (0.148) (0.101) (0.143)
Artist-Buyer Link -0.079 0.014 -0.013 -0.020 -0.031 -0.053
(0.050) (0.335) (0.298) (0.290) (0.373) (0.429)
Seller: Family -0.307*** -0.265 -0.256 -0.231* -0.209** -0.260*
(0.060) (0.166) (0.120) (0.098) (0.108) (0.125)
Log Seller's 0.003 0.008 -0.003 -0.020 -0.016 -0.008
past volume (0.019) (0.058) (0.042) (0.032) (0.034) (0.042)
Unknown Seller -0.137*** -0.078* -0.116** -0.125** -0.142** -0.167*
(0.028) (0.084) (0.073) (0.058) (0.073) (0.100)
Christie's Dummy 0.463*** 1.252*** 0.621*** 0.356* 0.251 0.179
(0.077) (0.497) (0.450) (0.331) (0.272) (0.254)
ρ̂ -0.025 -0.060
(0.103) (0.444)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Artist Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total number of observations is 7,760 for all columns. Sample selection on the mean uses the method
of Heckman (1979) while for the quantiles Arellano, Blundell, and Bonhomme (2017) is used. Other
control variables include a cubic time trend, log number of buyers, a quadratic in the age of the artist,
a dummy for if the art was part of a collection, as well as seller type dummies, medium dummies,
and genre dummies. The standard errors are calculated using 1000 bootstrap repetitions. * indicates
signicance at the 10% level, ** indicates signicance at the 5% level, *** indicates signicance at
the 1% level. Source: Authors' calculation.
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Table 2.4: Network at Death on Prices distribution
Quantiles(τ)
Variables of Interest Mean 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Panel A: Less than 2 years after death
Artist: Log Eigenvector 0.060* 0.041 0.053* 0.091** 0.119***
Centrality at Death (0.033) (0.029) (0.028) (0.036) (0.030)
Artist: Log Number 0.060 0.095 0.047 -0.036 0.000
of Art Sold (0.067) (0.074) (0.063) (0.076) (0.063)
Seller: Family -0.543*** -0.269* -0.481*** -0.529*** -0.755***
(0.154) (0.145) (0.123) (0.154) (0.130)
Seller: Log Past Volume -0.063 -0.025 -0.010 0.011 -0.075
(0.077) (0.084) (0.057) (0.080) (0.071)
R2 0.311 0.278 0.290 0.262 0.168
Panel B: Between 2 and 10 years after death
Artist: Log Eigenvector 0.022 0.006 0.015 0.047* 0.068**
Centrality at Death (0.022) (0.015) (0.017) (0.028) (0.028)
Artist: Log Number -0.119 -0.112 -0.026 0.049 0.128**
of Art Sold (0.115) (0.121) (0.117) (0.108) (0.052)
Seller: Family -0.813* -1.137*** -0.555 -0.492 0.034
(0.465) (0.415) (0.575) (0.330) (0.317)
Seller: Log Past Volume -0.056 -0.044 -0.062*** -0.095** -0.149***
(0.039) (0.035) (0.040) (0.042) (0.055)
R2 0.246 0.232 0.227 0.173 0.117
Panel C: Between 10 and 20 years after death
Artist: Log Eigenvector -0.021 -0.031 -0.013 0.046* 0.094***
Centrality at Death (0.028) (0.029) (0.022) (0.027) (0.034)
Artist: Log Number 0.042 0.044 0.079 0.115* 0.141**
of Art Sold (0.081) (0.065) (0.063) (0.068) (0.070)
Seller: Family 0.226 0.060 0.769* 0.723*** 0.240
(0.697) (1.179) (0.436) (0.258) (0.195)
Seller: Log Past Volume -0.040 -0.040 -0.020 -0.034 -0.037
(0.035) (0.028) (0.060) (0.056) (0.066)
R2 0.379 0.362 0.367 0.325 0.266
Total number of observations is 902 in Panel A, 1,876 in Panel B and 1,855 in Panel C.
R2 for quantile regressions is actually pseudo R2. Other control variables include a cubic
time trend, log number of buyers, a quadratic in the age of the artist, A dummy if sold at
Christie's, a dummy for if the art was part of a collection, as well as seller type dummies,
medium dummies, and genre dummies. Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis.
* indicates signicance at the 10% level, ** indicates signicance at the 5% level, ***
indicates signicance at the 1% level. Source: Authors' calculation.
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Number of Change Orders 4.272 4.245 1 35 254
Change Order Amount (thousands of dollars) 105.02 185.10 -116.85 1421.65 254
Change Order Percentage 7.173 9.525 -17.28 61.89 254
Number of Subcontractors 5.093 3.291 0 21 312
Number of Items Subcontracted 31.87 32.15 0 191 312
Percentage Subcontracted 19.79 14.43 0 82.11 312
Engineering Cost Estimate (millions of dollars) 1.910 2.432 0.026 24.551 312
Expected Duration (days) 191.619 124.562 14 813 312
Number of Items 60.228 35.346 2 245 312
Elevation (hundreds of feet) 7.164 3.704 1 22.5 312
Engineer Experience (projects) 16.032 11.820 1 41.5 312
Firm Experience (years) 66.017 45.171 3 140 303
Expected Number of Bidders 2.516 2.743 0 11.524 281
Unemployment Rate 4.637 1.431 3.3 7.3 312
Real Volume of Projects (millions of dollars) 3.049 2.678 0.038 13.979 312
Number of Subcontractors in the Market 98.385 25.957 15 128 312
Contractor Outdegree Centrality 8.978 10.774 0 38 312
Contractor Hub Centrality 0.045 0.069 0 0.226 312
Contractor Past Item Experience (percentage) 0.646 0.338 0 1 312
Subcontractors Hired 0.052 0.222 0 1 30696
Contractor-Subcontractor link 0.091 0.288 0 1 30696
Subcontractor Indegree Centrality 1.658 2.479 0 24 30696
Subcontractor Authority Centrality 0.004 0.010 0 0.082 30696
Horizontal Subcontractor 0.080 0.272 0 1 30696
DBE Subcontractor 0.292 0.455 0 1 30696
Subcontractor Item Experience (percent) 0.128 0.217 0 1 30696
Subcontractor Unique Item Dummy 0.243 0.429 0 1 30696
100
Table 3.2: Bidding and renegotiation activities of 92 rms
Firm ID (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
(1) 71 35.954 65 6.894 3.775 6.45 0.266
(2) 33 12.204 30 8.374 3.970 6.21 0.254
(3) 9 10.147 8 4.408 8.889 9.11 0.235
(4) 8 4.976 6 7.118 2.625 4.25 0.214
(5) 9 3.697 9 3.183 6.333 7.00 0.143
(6) 8 3.359 7 10.550 5.125 6.25 0.190
(7) 12 2.417 10 6.016 3.583 5.42 0.210
(8) 8 1.956 8 2.714 3.250 5.88 0.211
(9) 8 1.781 7 5.877 3.125 6.38 0.136
(Remaining 83 Firms) 146 23.509 104 4.874 2.692 3.66 0.177
All Firms 312 100.000 254 5.859 3.478 5.09 0.225
(A): Number of Wins
(B): Value of Winning Projects/Value of Procured
(C): Number of Contracts Renegotiated
(D): Average Value of Change Orders/Winning Bid on Project (%)
(E): Average Number of Change Orders per Project
(F): Average Number of Subcontractors Used
(F): Percentage of Bid Completed by Subcontractors
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Project Subs Hired -0.149***
(0.032)
At Least 1 Sub Hired 2.250***
(0.276)
Rival Sub: Items % -0.794**
(0.356)
Unique Item: Prime and Rival 2.296***
(0.238)
Edge 2.492*** 2.281*** 2.288***
(0.112) (0.101) (0.101)
Log Available Subs 0.100 -0.462** -0.463**
(0.262) (0.210) (0.211)
Prime: Outdegree -0.033*** -0.029*** -0.029***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Prime: Log Hub -0.007 -0.017 -0.015
(0.053) (0.044) (0.044)
Prime: Item % -6.185*** -4.969*** -4.984***
(0.562) (0.473) (0.479)
Prime: Item % sqr 4.169*** 3.127*** 3.135***
(0.570) (0.486) (0.491)
Sub: Indegree 0.198*** 0.169*** 0.170***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Sub: Log Authority 0.253*** 0.254*** 0.255***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.029)
Sub: DBE 0.499*** 0.498*** 0.498***
(0.090) (0.083) (0.084)
Sub: Horizontal Sub -0.254* -0.221* -0.221*
(0.140) (0.127) (0.128)
Sub: Item % 1.988*** 2.027*** 2.038***
(0.587) (0.543) (0.542)
Sub: Item % sqr -2.968*** -2.589*** -2.615***
(0.710) (0.664) (0.665)
Unique Item: Prime -1.095*** 0.506*** 0.508***
(0.211) (0.092) (0.092)
Prime: Top Firm 0.121*** 0.167 0.168
(0.034) (0.114) (0.112)
Observations 28,678 28,678 28,678
Simulated Log Likelihood -3412.2 -3621.7 -3629.9
Simulated Pseudo R2 0.388 0.350 0.349
*** Denotes statistical signicance at the 1% level, ** denotes signicance at the 5%
and * denotes signicance at the 10% level. Standard deviation of posterior in paren-
thesis for Columns 1 and 3. Standard errors in parenthesis for Column 2. Additional
control variables include Log Project Duration, Number of Items, Log Engineer's Es-
timate, Elevation and its square, a Top Firm Dummy, Engineer's Experience, Firm's
Experience, Expected Number of Bidders, Unemployment Rate, Log Volume, and
Dummies for Project Type. Full Results available upon request.
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Table 3.4: Predicting Actual Subcontractor use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sequential Simultaneous
ML Bayesian
ˆsub 0.815*** 0.295*** 0.744*** 0.249*** 0.743*** 0.249***
(0.049) (0.095) (0.045) (0.074) (0.045) (0.074)
Log of Expected Duration -0.253 -0.272 -0.270
(0.272) (0.266) (0.266)
Number of Items 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.050***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Log of Engineer's Estimate 0.230 0.262 0.262
(0.172) (0.168) (0.168)
Elevation (hundreds of feet) -0.027 -0.033 -0.033
(0.091) (0.091) (0.091)
Elevation squared 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Top Firm 0.796* 0.868** 0.864**
(0.416) (0.402) (0.402)
Engineer Experience (projects) 0.052 0.035 0.037
(0.233) (0.234) (0.234)
Firm Experience (years) -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Expected Number of Bidders 0.036 0.037 0.037
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Unemployment Rate 0.044 0.048 0.047
(0.079) (0.080) (0.080)
Log Volume -0.079 -0.091 -0.090
(0.128) (0.128) (0.128)
Asphalt Project 0.277 0.335 0.332
(0.478) (0.465) (0.465)
Bridge Project 0.214 0.295 0.294
(0.504) (0.489) (0.489)
Observations 273 273 273 273 273 273
R2 0.582 0.673 0.549 0.673 0.549 0.673
*** Denotes statistical signicance at the 1% level, ** denotes signicance at the 5% and * denotes
signicance at the 10% level. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ˆsub is the predicted level of
subcontracting from 16,000 simulations of results.
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Table 3.5: Number of Change Orders
Full Sample Subsample
GMM GMM IV GMM Proxy GMM GMM GMM Proxy
Number of Subcontractors 0.053*** 0.165** 0.045*** 0.133***
(0.020) (0.073) (0.017) (0.043)
ˆsub 0.071*** 0.075***
(0.025) (0.023)
Log Duration 0.243** 0.290** 0.235* 0.194 0.236** 0.197*
(0.122) (0.115) (0.121) (0.119) (0.111) (0.117)
Number of Items 0.004* -0.004 0.003 0.005*** -0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Log of Engineer Estimate 0.172** 0.103 0.172** -0.028 -0.090 -0.020
(0.079) (0.096) (0.083) (0.078) (0.087) (0.080)
Elevation (hundreds of feet) 0.081* 0.078* 0.082** 0.087** 0.080** 0.080**
(0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035)
Elevation squared -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.004** -0.004** -0.003**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Top Firm 0.054 -0.064 0.024 0.076 -0.046 0.053
(0.151) (0.185) (0.151) (0.155) (0.185) (0.154)
Engineer Experience (projects) -0.110 -0.088 -0.121 -0.170* -0.150 -0.189**
(0.094) (0.100) (0.095) (0.089) (0.094) (0.089)
Firm Experience (years) 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Expected Number of Bidders 0.003 -0.006 0.003 -0.032 -0.042* -0.030
(0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Unemployment Rate 0.007 -0.003 -0.001 0.036 0.025 0.025
(0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) (0.032)
Log Volume -0.047 -0.017 -0.046 -0.082** -0.058 -0.078*
(0.047) (0.056) (0.046) (0.041) (0.047) (0.040)
Asphalt Project -0.047 -0.151 -0.047 0.227 0.130 0.191
(0.243) (0.275) (0.235) (0.282) (0.310) (0.275)
Bridge Project -0.076 -0.133 -0.084 0.093 0.001 0.057
(0.231) (0.249) (0.228) (0.282) (0.301) (0.280)
Observations 273 273 273 173 173 173
*** Denotes statistical signicance at the 1% level, ** denotes signicance at the 5% and * denotes signicance
at the 10% level. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3.6: Value of Contract Renegotiation
Value of Change (Change Orders Log(Value of
Orders ($10,000) / Estimate) X100 Change Orders +1)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Number of Subcontractors 1.336* 4.823* 0.619** 1.785* 0.151 0.736
(0.726) (2.671) (0.259) (0.997) (0.114) (0.651)
Log of Engineer Estimate 4.030*** 2.828* 0.958** 0.766*
(1.441) (1.576) (0.386) (0.432)
Log Duration 4.707 5.978* 2.589* 2.826* 1.628** 1.842***
(3.289) (3.392) (1.557) (1.550) (0.662) (0.712)
Number of Items -0.050 -0.285 -0.080** -0.166** 0.003 -0.036
(0.076) (0.186) (0.032) (0.079) (0.014) (0.047)
Elevation (hundreds of feet) 0.387 0.539 -0.268 -0.228 0.075 0.082
(0.686) (0.821) (0.421) (0.439) (0.234) (0.233)
Elevation squared -0.030 -0.042 0.000 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007
(0.033) (0.042) (0.019) (0.020) (0.011) (0.011)
Top Firm -3.513 -7.570 -0.819 -2.305 -0.375 -1.034
(3.992) (5.940) (1.559) (2.164) (0.903) (1.133)
Engineer Experience (projects) -1.359 -1.537 -0.493 -0.707 0.385 0.264
(1.996) (2.118) (0.923) (0.939) (0.460) (0.481)
Firm Experience (years) 0.019 0.042 0.021 0.028 0.019* 0.024**
(0.050) (0.060) (0.021) (0.023) (0.010) (0.011)
Expected Number of Bidders -0.167 -0.339 0.201 0.150 0.239** 0.207*
(0.319) (0.379) (0.250) (0.251) (0.115) (0.117)
Unemployment Rate 0.701 0.475 0.197 0.100 -0.059 -0.099
(0.628) (0.642) (0.369) (0.361) (0.176) (0.182)
Log Volume -0.130 0.278 0.266 0.372 0.195 0.256
(0.785) (0.765) (0.600) (0.597) (0.214) (0.223)
Asphalt Project 4.719** 3.203 2.806* 2.290 -0.738 -1.099
(2.344) (3.002) (1.629) (1.746) (0.896) (1.001)
Bridge Project -1.637 -3.034 2.623 2.189 -0.977 -1.360
(2.646) (3.348) (1.816) (1.893) (0.897) (1.045)
Observations 273 273 273 273 257 257
R2 0.205 0.059 0.069 0.001 0.310 0.250
*** Denotes statistical signicance at the 1% level, ** denotes signicance at the 5% and * denotes




A1.1 Potential Planholder's Decision to Bid
Table A1.1.1: Potential Planholder Bid Decision: Win-
dows
Constant Jaccard Cosine Overlap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: 6-month window
ρ1 -0.143 -0.017 -0.010***
(0.107) (0.067) (0.003)
ρ0 0.000 0.015 0.003 0.029**
(0.009) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014)
Log Likelihood -3938.7 -3937.8 -3938.7 -3934.2
Pseudo R2 0.129 0.130 0.129 0.130
Panel B: 18-month window
ρ1 0.108 0.154** -0.001
(0.090) (0.060) (0.002)
ρ0 -0.002 -0.015 -0.037** 0.003
(0.008) (0.013) (0.015) (0.011)
Log Likelihood -4160.5 -4159.7 -4157.1 -4160.3
Pseudo R2 0.139 0.140 0.140 0.139
The results use all the same regressors and methods as Table
A1.1.2. Panel A has 562 auctions, 8,722 potential planholders,
and 69,552 potential planholder pairs. Panel B has 494 auctions,
9,836 potential planholders, and 101,901 potential planholder
pairs. General Aliation is tested for in Column 1. Columns
2, 3, and 4 allow aliation between rms to vary according to
their jaccard similarities, cosine similarities and number of over-
lapping subcontractors respectively. Standard errors are shown
in parenthesis. * indicates signicance at the 10% level, ** sig-
nicance at the 5% level, and *** signicance at the 1% level.
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Table A1.1.2: Potential Planholder Bid Decision
Constant Jaccard Cosine Overlap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ρ1 0.123 0.150** -0.001
(0.094) (0.061) (0.002)
ρ0 -0.001 -0.015 -0.034** 0.003
(0.008) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012)
Potential Bidders -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log PlanCost 0.080* 0.078* 0.077* 0.081*
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Log Working Days 0.315*** 0.312*** 0.309*** 0.316***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
Log Items -0.501*** -0.495*** -0.492*** -0.502***
(0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080)
DBE Goal -0.009 -0.010 -0.010* -0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Time Trend 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
OK Unemployment 0.169*** 0.166*** 0.163*** 0.170***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Distance (100 mi) -0.690*** -0.687*** -0.684*** -0.691***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Backlog ($mill) -0.087*** -0.086*** -0.085*** -0.087***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Outdegree Centrality -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.020***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Hub Centrality 27.486*** 27.361*** 27.126*** 27.524***
(2.693) (2.715) (2.720) (2.688)
Horizontal Sub -0.084*** -0.086*** -0.086*** -0.084***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Log Likelihood -4137.6 -4136.7 -4134.5 -4137.5
Pseudo R2 0.136 0.136 0.137 0.136
The results of the replication of Li and Zhang (2010) on ODOT data are
seen in Column 1. Columns 2, 3, and 4 allow aliation between rms to
vary according to their jaccard similarities, cosine similarities and number
of overlapping subcontractors respectively. All columns use 700 simula-
tion. Finite dierences are used to estimate derivatives. Standard errors
are shown in parenthesis. * indicates signicance at the 10% level, **
signicance at the 5% level, and *** signicance at the 1% level.
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Table A1.1.3: Potential Planholder Bid Decision: No
Network
Constant Jaccard Cosine Overlap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ρ1 0.159* 0.177*** 0.000
(0.093) (0.061) (0.002)
ρ2 0.015 0.035 -0.002
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
ρ3 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ρ4 0.108*** 0.128*** 0.090**
(0.039) (0.040) (0.038)
ρ0 0.002 -0.024* -0.044*** -0.006
(0.007) (0.013) (0.015) (0.011)
Log Likelihood -5011.3 -5005.8 -5002.9 -5007.3
Pseudo R2 0.136 0.137 0.137 0.136
The expands the results of Table A1.1.2 to incorporate rms
with no observed network. This leads to an increased sample
size of 516 auctions, 12,209 potential planholders, and 155,286
potential planholder pairs. General Aliation is tested for in
Column 1. Columns 2, 3, and 4 allow aliation between rms
to vary according to their jaccard similarities, cosine similari-
ties and number of overlapping subcontractors respectively. The
number of simulations used increases to 800. Standard errors are
shown in parenthesis.* indicates signicance at the 10% level, **
signicance at the 5% level, and *** signicance at the 1% level.
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Table A1.1.4: Potential Planholder Bid Decision:
Weighted Network
Constant Jaccard Cosine Overlap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ρ1 0.383*** 0.370*** 0.002
(0.130) (0.088) (0.012)
ρ0 -0.005 -0.016* -0.031*** -0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
Outdegree ($mil) -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Hub Centrality -0.969 -1.002 -1.045 -0.969
(0.633) (0.638) (0.640) (0.634)
Log Liklihood -4265.6 -4261.8 -4257.1 -4265.6
Pseudo R2 0.109 0.110 0.111 0.109
The expands the results of Table A1.1.2 to dollar weights to rm's
network. General Aliation is tested for in Column 1. Columns 2,
3, and 4 allow aliation between rms to vary according to their
jaccard similarities, cosine similarities and number of overlapping
subcontractors respectively. Standard errors are shown in paren-
thesis. * indicates signicance at the 10% level, ** signicance at




Table A2.1.1: Variable Denitions
Variable Denition
Price The hammer price of a work sold in an English auction
recorded in pounds.
Average Number of Bidders Number of unique seller who purchased artwork in the
auction house on the day a artwork was sold
Posthumous Dummy variable indicating if an artwork is sold follow the
artist's death.
Artist Eigenvector Centrality Eigenvector centrality of an artist in the 10 years prior
to the sale date. Eigenvector centrality measures the relative
inuence of nodes (in this case an artist) in a network by
calculating the primary eigenvector of the network adjacency
matrix. The variable is continuous on the interval [0,1]
Artist Eigenvector Centrality Eigenvector centrality of an artist calculated in the
at Death window from 10 years before an artist death till their death.
The variable is continuous on the interval [0,1]
Artist Log Number of Art Sold Number of pieces by an artist sold at auction in the 10 years
prior to the sale date.
Buyer Eigenvector Centrality Eigenvector centrality of a buyer in the 10 years prior to the
sale date. The variable is continuous on the interval [0,1]
Buyer Capacity Highest amount ever spent by a buyer in the past.
Artist-Buyer link Dummy indicating a buyer has purchased an artwork
by the artist in the 10 years prior to the sale date.
Seller: Family Dummy indicating the seller's name and artist's name in
Graves's records match
Seller: Past Volume Number of pieces sold by the seller in the 10 years prior to
the sale date.
Seller: Unknown Dummy indicating the seller is listed as Unknown in Grave's records
Christie's Dummy indicating a work was sold at Christie's auction house
Max Rival Eigenvector Highest eigenvector centrality of the other bidders
Centrality at auction
Max Rival Capacity Highest Capacity of the other bidders at auction
Mean Rival Artist-Buyer Link Percentage of other bidders which have previously purchased an
artist's work.
Medium Medium of an artwork. Can be a painting, drawing, sculpture,
engraving, or copy
Genre Genre of an artwork. Can be animal, landscape, still life, history,
religion, mythology, genre, portrait, marine, or other.





Table A3.1.1: Variable Description
Variable Description
Edge Contractor has hired the potential subcontractor in the previous 12 months
Number of Subcontractors Number of subcontractors hired by the contractor for a project
ˆsub Number of predicted subcontractors from the sequential Bayesian model
Nijpt
Project Subs Hired Number of subcontractors hired on a project prior to current subcontractor
At Least 1 Sub Hired Dummy indicating at least 1 subcontractors hired prior to current subcontractor
Rival Sub: Item % Percentage of item types previously hired subcontractors have experience with
Unique: Item: Prime and Rival Dummy indicating the potential subcontractor has experience with an item which
neither the contractor or previously hired subcontractors have experience with
Nipt
Log Available Subs Natural logarithm of the number of subcontractors active in the market
Prime: Outdegree Centrality The number of unique subcontractor the contractor has worked with in the
previous 12 months
Prime: Log Hub Centrality The natural logarithm of contractors hub centrality in the network of contractors
and subcontractors in the previous 12 months
Prime: Missing Network Dummy indicating the contractor has not hired a subcontractor in the previous
12 months
Njpt
Sub: Indegree Centrality The number of unique contractors the potential subcontractor has worked with in
the previous 12 months
Sub: Log Authority Centrality The natural logarithm of potential subcontractors authority centrality in the
network of contractors and subcontractors in the previous 12 months
Sub: Missing Network Dummy indicating the potential subcontractor has not worked as a subcontractor
in the previous 12 months
Sub: DBE Dummy indicating the potential subcontractor is a disadvantage business enterprise
Sub: Horizontal Sub Dummy indicating the potential subcontractor performed work as a contractor in
the previous 12 months
Iijpt
Prime Item % Number of items the contractor has experience performing
Sub: Item % Number of items the potential subcontractor has experience performing
Unique Item: Prime Dummy indicating the potential subcontractor has experience with an item which
the contractor does not have experience with
Xipt
Log of Expected Duration Natural logarithm of expected project length in days
Number of Items Number of unique items required for a project
Log of Engineer's Estimate Natural logarithm of engineer's cost estimate
Elevation Number of feet above sea level the project is located
Top Firm Dummy indicating a rm is in the top 10% in terms of assets
Log Engineer's Experience Natural logarithm of number of projects the engineer worked on during the sample
Firm Experience Number of years the rm has been active in the market
Expected Number of Bidders Expected Number of Bidders based on publicly available information at the
time of letting
Log Volume Natural logarithm of the dollar value of projects in Vermont during
the month the project was let
Asphalt Project Dummy indicating the project is a repaving project
Bridge Project Dummy indicating the project is a bridge project
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A3.2 Network Example
To explain the hub and authority measures more fully, we created a simple stylized network,
example presented in Figure A3.2.1. It consists of four contractors, labeled A through D,
and eight subcontractors, labeled 1 through 8. The network is laid out in a similar way
as in Figure 3.4, with contractors represented by white nodes and subcontractors by red
nodes. The nodes are sized according to their hub (for contractors) and authority (for
subcontractors) centrality values. The values of the centrality measures can also be found
in Table A3.2.1.
This network example helps reveal how the ranking of hub (authority) centrality does
not always align with outdegree (indegree) centrality. Contractor A has a higher outdegree
centrality than contractor D, but since four of A's ve connections are to peripheral subcon-
tractors, while all three of D's connections are to central subcontractors, D has a higher hub
centrality. This same intuition follows when comparing contractors B and C. While C has
more connections it is less centrally located in the network, compared to B leading to lower
hub centrality.
With the subcontractors, the authority centrality does not overturn the ordering based
on indegree centrality, though in theory it could. The example highlights how subcontrac-
tors with the same number of connections can have dierent levels of authority centrality.
Subcontractors 1 and 2 both are linked to three of four contractors, but since 2 is linked to
the more centrally connected A, as compared with C, it has the higher authority centrality.
This pattern is repeated with the subcontractors 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 located in the periphery.
Since by the measure of hub centrality A is more central than C, its subcontractors end up
with higher authority centrality.
To calculate hub and authority centrality we use eigenvector theory and the adjacency
matrix of the network, which stores all links of the network in an N × N matrix. The
authority centrality is calculated as:
a = A · h
where a is an N × 1 vector of authority centralities, A is the adjacency matrix, and h is an
N × 1 vector of hub centralities. Similarly hub centrality is calculated as:
h = A′ · a
For small networks the centrality measures can be calculated analytically, but for larger
networks they are calculated by beginning with a constant vector and repeatedly iterating the
measures until a steady state is reached. For more information on hub, authority, outdegree
and indegree centrality measures see Bloch et al. (2019).
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Figure A3.2.1: Example Network















A3.3 Direct Network Eects on Renegotiation
One potential area of concern is that rms with large networks may systematically choose
more complex projects, thus violating the exclusion restriction for the instrumental variable.
In order to provide additional evidence that there is no such correlated complexity, we provide
regressions with additional control variables, namely the winning contractors outdegree and
hub centralities, and the subcontractor averages for indegree and authority centrality, for
use in Table A3.3.1. Whether only outdegree and indegree centrality (Columns 1 and 4),
hub and authority centrality (Columns 2 and 5), or all 4 are included (Columns 3 and 6) the
network variables are always statistically insignicant and the point estimates on the eect
of the number of subcontractors changes little. When considering the number of change
orders the eect remains statistically signicant, though for the value of change orders it
is not. These results provide evidence that contractor networks aect change orders only
indirectly through their impact on the number of subcontractors used in a project.
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Table A3.3.1: Correlated Unobserved Complexity across Projects
Number of Change Orders Value of Change Orders
GMM IV GMM IV GMM IV 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Number of Subcontractors 0.162** 0.163** 0.159** 4.744 4.387 4.305
(0.068) (0.071) (0.066) (2.907) (2.935) (2.791)
Prime: Outdegree 0.003 0.006 0.127 0.098
(0.008) (0.009) (0.194) (0.208)
Sub Average: Indegree 0.016 0.013 0.204 0.299
(0.027) (0.035) (0.497) (0.855)
Prime: Log Hub -0.029 -0.048 0.029 -0.291
(0.056) (0.058) (1.034) (1.042)
Sub Average: Log Authority 0.081 0.034 0.700 -0.041
(0.101) (0.094) (1.218) (1.931)
Observations 248 248 248 248 248 248
*** Denotes statistical signicance at the 1% level, ** denotes signicance at the 5% and *
denotes signicance at the 10% level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions
include the other control variables found in Tables 3.5 and 3.6.
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A3.4 Further Normalizations





ˆsub squared -0.203*** -0.160***
(0.033) (0.037)
Log of Expected Duration 0.553
(1.745)
Number of Items 0.044
(0.058)






Engineer Experience (projects) 0.549
(1.491)
Firm Experience (years) 0.019
(0.031)












*** Denotes statistical signicance at the 1% level, denotes
signicance at the 5% and * denotes signicance at the 10%
level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table A3.4.2: Percentage of Items Renegotated
(1) (2)
OLS 2SLS
Number of Subcontractors 0.350** 1.809**
(0.139) (0.756)
Log Expected Duration 2.001** 2.532***
(0.839) (0.929)
Number of Items -0.060*** -0.158***
(0.020) (0.059)
Log of Engineer Estimate 0.165 -0.338
(0.588) (0.641)
Elevation (hundreds of feet) 0.398 0.461
(0.301) (0.330)
Elevation squared -0.017 -0.023
(0.013) (0.015)
Top Firm 0.712 -0.984
(1.036) (1.303)
Engineer Experience (projects) -1.435 -1.510
(1.009) (1.013)
Firm Experience (years) 0.004 0.014
(0.011) (0.013)
Expected Number of Bidders -0.106 -0.178
(0.194) (0.212)
Unemployment Rate -0.102 -0.196
(0.285) (0.316)
Log Volume 0.235 0.406
(0.339) (0.382)
Asphalt Project -0.536 -1.170
(1.776) (1.849)
Bridge Project -0.511 -1.095
(2.105) (2.137)
Observations 273 273
*** Denotes statistical signicance at the 1% level, ** de-
notes signicance at the 5% and * denotes signicance at
the 10% level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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